## Equity Research

November 18, 2014

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| HLF | $\$ 38$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| 12 month target | $\$ 55$ |
| Upside | $45 \%$ |
| BUY |  |
| 52 week range | $\$ 37-\$ 84$ |
| Market Cap $(\mathrm{m})$ | $\$ 3,518$ |

## BTIG Consumer Staples

## HERBALIFE LTD

## Stock Trades on Sentiment; However, on Valuation/ Fundamentals, It's Undervalued; Initiate at Buy/\$55 tgt

Great industry dynamics \& strong business model, but this is not the current focus as stock continues to trade on sentiment, not fundamentals. Importantly, we're confident Herbalife isn't a pyramid scheme. However, we believe the stock will continue to trade on sentiment, so we'd approach with caution despite significant upside potential. Initiate with Buy.

- Trades on sentiment, but shouldn't get worse. On a fundamental view, this is an attractive business -- great margins, asset light, continued strong recruitment trends. That is clearly not the investor focus short-term, however, and stock can move 15\%+ if an activist shareholder simply indicates he might say something.
- Not a pyramid scheme but unclear if/when overhang removed. Civil Investigative Demand (CID) from FTC in March is a request for info, not an inquiry, \& we believe a negative ruling is unlikely. Distributors get no fees for recruiting, minimal start-up cost (<\$100), most income is sales to consumers, \& liberal return policy. Still, nothing requires FTC to decide quickly, in keeping with past precedent, or at all, so overhang remains.
- US slowdown may continue if not just due to policy changes. New policies still being implemented globally, leading to a redux in $4 \mathrm{O} \& \mathrm{~F}_{15}$ guidance. US softness last 2 Os (avg -2\% organic vs 10\% for 8 Os prior) was blamed on these changes but may also reflect a shift in morale due to headlines and/or increased compliance hurdles. If either of these is at play, the declines in US organic could accelerate. We account for this with $-4 \%$ organic in F15.
- Valuation: 50\% Relative/50\% DCF yields a $\$ 55$ price target


## Estimates

|  | 1Q13 A | 2Q13 A | 3Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14 E | FY15 E |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | 1,124 | 1,219 | 1,214 | 1,269 | 4,825 | 1,263 | 1,306 | 1,256 | 1,187 | 5,012 | 5,004 |
| Gross Margin (\%) | $79.9 \%$ | $79.7 \%$ | $80.4 \%$ | $81.4 \%$ | $80.4 \%$ | $80.1 \%$ | $80.3 \%$ | $80.3 \%$ | $81.4 \%$ | $80.5 \%$ | $80.5 \%$ |
| EBIT (Adj.) | 194 | 204 | 205 | 198 | 800 | 222 | 210 | 188 | 174 | 794 | 718 |
| Diluted EPS (Adj.) | 1.27 | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.28 | 5.37 | 1.50 | 1.55 | 1.45 | 1.33 | 5.84 | 5.61 |
| Net Income | 119 | 143 | 142 | 124 | 528 | 75 | 120 | 11 | 115 | 320 | 478 |

## Source: BTIG Research Estimates and Company Documents (\$ in millions, except per share amount)

Adjusted values exclude one-time items.

## The Key Debate

## When Will Fundamentals Come Back in Vogue

Great industry dynamics, as obesity and health care drive consumers to improve their lifestyles/diets. Business model also strong \& asset light, with more than double the margins of some MLM peers. Sales Leader growth remains robust and steps being taken (in our view) to reduce risk of FTC action \& improve retention rates.

Industry dynamics are great. Health \& Wellness has strong industry dynamics and demographic support. Current trends toward obesity \& increasing health care concerns are making consumers more mindful of lifestyle and diet. Herbalife caters to this trend, not just with its products but also the de facto support groups created with nutrition clubs, fit clubs etc. From a demographic perspective, we don't see this changing in the foreseeable future. If anything, the Millennial generation is more concerned with health \& wellness than those prior and once they control a larger portion of investor spend we would expect industry trends (already growing high-single-digits) to further accelerate.

Business model is strong. Benchmarking against peers, we believe Herbalife's business model stands out with peer-leading, less volatile margins. Although we don't model any increase beyond $F_{15}$, we think upside potential exists on margin expansion.

- Peer-leading margins. One reasons (which detractors criticize, we think unfairly) is that unlike other MLMs, Herbalife doesn't publish an expensive brochure, so cost of marketing (word of mouth) is not a cost per se but a reduction of revenues, given higher rewards Sales Leaders are eligible for when downlines sell.


## Operating Margin: FY14E vs. 10-Yr Range



Source: Company reports, BTIG Research Estimates.

- Asset Light. Although Herbalife is investing heavily in its "Seed to Feed" program (to increase self-manufacturing, research, \& distribution capabilities), it remains an asset light, and more efficient model v peers. Current efficiency levels are also near the bottom-end of 10-year historical range, leaving room for improvement/upside.

Sales / Capital: FY14E vs. 10-Yr Range


Working Cap \% Sales: FY14E vs. 10-Yr
Range

Source: Company reports, BTIG Research Estimates.

- Sales Leader Growth remains strong. Given industry dynamics, it's not surprising that Sales Leader Growth overall remains strong, but we've been surprised to see how little disruption there's been in North American Sales Leaders. Although productivity is down, Active Sales Leaders has continued to climb upwards (last 2Os being the exception) despite headline noise \& increased compliance burden.

Sales Leader: Average Annual Growth


Source: Company reports, BTIG Research Estimates. Note: HLF measures sales leaders only while peer metrics represent total sales force

- Retention should improve. We believe initiatives on Sales Leader qualification (lowering 12-month volume point target, instituting first order limits) can further improve retention \& keep average annual growth above peers. Making it easier to qualify incentivizes new members to build slow; \& sustainably. Herbalife has already had success with the transition in Russia, where retention for first time sales leaders increased from $<50 \%$ to $\sim 75 \%$.

Margins rarely a topic with Herbalife but could be an opportunity. Herbalife recently disclosed they will self-manufacture $65 \%$ of products by F16 vs $40 \%$ now. They've also
mentioned plans to invest in better packaging \& promoting of products, collaborating with doctors and scientists and stressing science. It's possible Herbalife will reinvest margin benefits of self-manufacturing. However, this recent data point arouses our suspicion that there's hidden margin opportunity that could provide cushion if US results get weaker and/or are weak longer than anticipated. Herbalife has mentioned net source/supply chain savings initiatives in the past, but to the best of our knowledge, they've never had a formal cost savings program, nor have they performed a deep analysis of potential savings. Therefore, potentially all areas of cost cutting historically focused on by HPC companies are still available.

## Concerns on fundamentals:

- Productivity has been in a protracted decline. Herbalife's productivity is on pace to decline for the $4^{\text {th }}$ straight year and has already declined for 4 of the last 6 . Our model assumes steady declines through F18.

Average Sales Force Productivity Growth


Source: Company reports, BTIG Research estimates.

- Historical price increases may not continue. Herbalife has averaged $\sim 4 \%$ annually since 2007, contributing $\sim 30 \%$ of annual organic growth. Any slowdown could disrupt peer-leading organic growth.
- Active Sales reps which have continued trending up, could inflect. The streak of 4 straight years with +DD sales rep growth is likely to end in F14, and this slowdown may not be temporary. Overall, we're surprised the bad press hasn't led to more disruption, but coupled with execution risk on retention improvement efforts, a continued slowdown in sales force growth could permanently lower growth.
- After a steady climb, margins have deteriorated over the last 2 quarters, in conjunction with the U.S. slowdown. If sales force productivity continues to decline, we could see margins deteriorate further.

| Pyramid Scheme | Herbalife |
| :--- | :--- |
| *Income mainly based on \# of people you recruit/rewards unrelated to | *income based entirely on sales - either yours or downlines'; Members are not |
| product sales to end users | paid for sponsoring other Members <br> *no requirement to purchase beyond start up pack (<\$100) <br> *Required to buy lots of inventory/volume requirements <br> *Deceptive earnings claims <br> *Must buy unwanted stuff to be in good standing <br> *Flear earnings claims |
| *Base level of sales to graduate to Sales Leader, but can be regained if lost |  |
| *High churn | Only fee is start up kit (money-back gurantee), hard to lose $\$$ especially as <br> $>70 \%$ of Members are "single level," purchasing products for own consumption <br> Churn low given amount of internal consumption \& recent initiatives reduce |

## What and When Will FTC Decide?

Distributors get no fees for recruiting, only cost is the Member start-up kit (<\$100, moneyback guarantee), the vast majority of the income opportunity is for product sales, there's little to no incentive for inventory loading, \& Herbalife has a very liberal return policy. As a result, we're confident Herbalife does not violate current FTC rules. There is, however, nothing preventing the FTC from making rules stricter \& this could require significant costs for Herbalife to comply. We believe this possibility is remote (if Herbalife is deemed a pyramid scheme, so too would a swathe of the direct selling industry) but government policy is impossible to predict.

Herbalife vocal about its confidence any FTC action will be limited. To the best of our knowledge, Herbalife isn't involved in settlement negotiations with regulators, yet they're confident enough they won't be charged with significant wrongdoing that they have made this opinion very public, often stated and presented as fact. It's unclear what is driving this confidence, but perhaps the same process informing our own.
"Pyramid Scheme" - Defined (As Currently Written). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considers a company a pyramid scheme if "the real way to make money isn't by selling that product but by recruiting other people to pay money for the right to sell that product." The FTC Act also prohibits "deceptive and misleading practices," which don't make typical earnings clear. We understand multi-level marketing defense attorneys typically advise clients that $80 \%$ or more of enterprise money should be directly related to sales of products or servicing of customers.

Overhang unlikely to be lifted near-term. Unfortunately, the FTC has no time limit for making a decision, nor does it necessarily need to make one. In any case, the high profile of this case (external pressures from activists, politicians, media, etc) is likely to extend the process beyond historical averages. As a result, even though the CID was announced 8+ months ago (more than a year post-controversy), ruling may still be far away. For reference, it took 12 months after announcing an investigation for the FTC to reach a settlement BurnLounge, and a further 3 years to get a court judgment for monetary relief. For reference, BurnLounge was a much smaller company and (in our opinion) a more straightforward case with less external scrutiny.

## Debates Within the Debate...

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the logic we've heard:
\rightarrow \text { Herbalife has a high level of internal sales ( } \sim 7 1 \% \text { of distributors buy for own use only)}
\rightarrow \text { Pyramid scheme rep income stream largely from transactions other than sales to customers}
->When a distributor buys for own use, technically this is a sale to a distributor, not a customer
\rightarrow \text { Herbalife must be a pyramid scheme}
We disagree.
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Internal sales are, in our opinion, a sale to an end consumer/customer. In order to be classified as a pyramid scheme, a significant portion of a distributor's income opportunity must be from recruiting (or taken to the extreme, anything other than sales to customers). While some believe Herbalife's high level of internal sales should be classified as "sales to distributors", not "sales to consumers," this is a purely semantic argument in our view. We think the FTC is unlikely to crack down on internal sales, as in essence, the consumer/distributor is a distributor in name only.


In reality, they are a customer purchasing a product directly from Herbalife for their own use and receiving a "distributor" discount. We will concede there's some inventory build at fitness clubs. We can neither track nor estimate this, but believe it's below any worrisome threshold. Furthermore, BurnLounge provides precedent (summary here, full Appeals Court opinion here) suggesting internal consumption is a valid measure of consumer demand.

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the logic we've heard:
Churn is high, with ~70% of Distributors dropping out within a year
->distributors churn when they lose money
\rightarrow \text { most Herbalife distributors lose money}
\rightarrow \text { Herbalife must be a pyramid scheme}
We disagree.
```

Churn in this business does not imply distributors have "lost" money. Although we understand churn is something the FTC looks at when examining potential pyramid schemes, we aren't concerned. According to Herbalife documents and our math, 80\%+ of distributors purchase for own consumption only (the $78 \%$ Herbalife states are singlelevel, no downline, plus a portion of the distributors who have downlines but aren't sales leaders and don't qualify for discounts). These "distributors" are likely to drop out within a year, yet "only" $67 \%$ do and, in our view, this is not really dropping out, since buying discounted product \& then deactivating was the intention all along. Even if an
individual were pressured to buy, a very liberal return policy makes it virtually impossible for these distributors to lose money.

## Other Protections

Disclosure re: potential income easily available. Herbalife provides clear, accurate, and timely disclosures to prospective Members regarding potential income and provides realistic expectations of the business opportunity and the effort required to succeed at all levels. While past compensation disclosures didn't include information on the number of single-level members (see the 2002 disclosure here), they've always included transparency on the average gross earning opportunity for Active distributors/sales leaders. Transparency has increased further since a vocal short seller began making headlines about Herbalife (see here for the 2013 report vs. here for the 2011 report).

No minimum purchases, low start-up costs, everything refundable. In its "Gold Standard," Herbalife states there is no requirement to purchase sales or business tools to become a distributor other than the $<\$ 100$ Member Pack. Distributors are also not required to buy minimum volume amounts. A discount is awarded at any purchase level, while sales leaders must maintain their status to retain their $50 \%$ discount on all products.

## Modifying Biz to Prep for Possible FTC Actions

HLF making changes to biz, we believe anticipating possible rule changes. Herbalife has been introducing additional member training, compliance functionality, \& better disclosure regarding income opportunity to better product its members but also, we believe, in anticipation of any potential rule changes the FTC could make. As a result of these, business has temporarily slowed but Herbalife is retaining more reps than at any time during its history. Our model takes a conservative view and assumes sustained declines in sales leader growth, until ending flat by F18. We believe there is upside potential as we have confidence in the recent rep retention initiatives to sufficiently maintain sales force while attracting new reps.

Sales leader qualification at 4 K vs 5 K slows growth but helps retention. As stated above, we believe the FTC at least looks at churn when making its decisions, so reducing churn is not a bad thing, even if that churn wasn't a result of distributor losses (as we've discussed). In an effort to reduce churn, Herbalife has amended the 5 K qualification for the 12 -month route $\&$ now requires only 4 K volume points for sales leader qualification over the same time period. The historical qualification thresholds for the 1-month route and 2 -month routes were $4 \mathrm{~K} \& 2.5 \mathrm{~K}$ volume points in their respective timeframes. The new rules simplify qualifications as volume point requirement is identical now, regardless of whether a distributor qualifies over a period of one month or 12. This encourages a slower ramp in the member's business (a key factor hitting US sales which will be discussed in the next section - see page 10) but it is increasing retention.

First order limitations also help retention/reduce short-term growth. Herbalife also initiated first order limits in Russia, China and parts of EMEA to slow distributor ramp, with the intention of reducing churn. First order limits will be rolled out globally to
nearly all markets by March 2015, after proof of concept in Russia was obtained (retention rates from $50 \%$ to $\sim 75 \%$ ).

All sales leaders now order directly from HLF, reducing potential risk. Sales leaders could historically buy from other distributors, and while we see nothing inherently wrong with this, at its most extreme reading, these sales would not be considered sales to customers, but rather sales to distributors (see our discussion of internal sales on page 6 as we believe the same principals apply). In our view, eliminating any payments to distributors for sources other than direct sales to consumers is smart. We don't believe this has been a material factor in the U.S. slowing (the same amount of product is still order theoretically, just from the company instead of fellow distributors).

Liberal return policy further liberalized. Under current return policies, it appears difficult to incur losses in any way other than negligence, in our opinion, as any/all product can be returned for any/all reasons by any/all distributors within 12 months of ordering (and Herbalife pays shipping). We'd concede there's potential for prior payments to be "clawed back" if members of a Sales Leader's downline return product, but Sales Leaders are but a small percentage of the "distributor" base and this is not a "loss" per se, only the eradication of a gain.

## Current Return Policy

$\rightarrow$ Member Pack is fully refundable within go-days if Membership is canceled for any reason
$\rightarrow$ all unopened product $100 \%$ refundable plus shipping costs for any returns within 12 months, if Membership canceled for any reason

- All products can be sold, if not to a consumer then back to Herbalife. Even the Member Pack is $100 \%$ refundable if a distributor decides not to pursue the earnings opportunity within 3 months of purchasing. All else is refundable up to a year. As a result, a distributor could potentially "lose" the $\$ 60 / \$ 95$ charged for the Member Kit if it does not cancel its membership within the 3-month window (note the Member Kit doesn't even need to be sent back, facilitating refund process). Still, this is a product with value and therefore not a total loss.
- Even open merchandise refundable, albeit must be within 30 days. Herbalife's website clearly states they have a 30 -day money-back guarantee. If dissatisfied with any opened purchases, one needs to simply return the unused portion within 30 days to receive a full refund. So yes, customers may end up paying for products they don't like if the value of the product return does not justify return shipping. The same, however, is true of product purchased in bricks and mortar stores, as consumers here ascribe a value to effort necessary to return the product. As a result, this is hardly unique to Herbalife

More compliance training introduced to ensure distributor conformity. Herbalife has moved to mandatory compliance training for members joining Herbalife for its business opportunity. In addition, once distributors become Sales Leaders, they're required to complete a formal company training program prior to royalty eligibility. This training includes the key do's and don'ts of direct selling. Further, all members who want to open a nutrition club are required to complete a formal company training program, with a 90 day waiting period. Also, beginning in 2014, Herbalife now requires annual recertification training as part of the requalification of sales leaders.

## Risks to FTC's CID

On the flip side, nothing prevents a rule change \& overhang may remain. Although we're confident Herbalife does not fit the FTC's current definition of pyramid scheme, nothing prevents the FTC from making current rules stricter \& there may be political incentive to do so given amount of scrutiny on Herbalife specifically \& MLMs generally. If rules are changed, it's unlikely Herbalife or others could be fined for past actions that breach the new policy. Still, amending business to comply with new rules could incur significant costs. Although we believe this possibility is remote (if Herbalife is deemed a pyramid scheme, so too would a swathe of direct selling companies - there are 200+ registered members of the Direct Selling Associates and an additional amount of nonmembers...recall, Avon is no longer a part of this association).

Other risks to our confidence Herbalife will not be ruled a Pyramid Scheme: (1) FTC leadership has changed significantly since 2012 (3 of 5 commissioners appointed since then); (2) in 2012, the FTC prosecuted Fortune High Tech Marketing and banned it from MLM, the first such action in over a decade; (3) This is the first time we've seen organized protests from distributors, the first time letters have come from members of Congress, and the first time a large activist hedge fund has advanced a fraud thesis; (4) prior, we would have expressed a similar level of confidence that FTC would investigated Herbalife and obviously that did happen. We don't know what goes on behind closed doors, even less what influences government agencies, so it's possible the fact pattern is different and/or historic interpretation of law will not hold.

## The Other Debates

## Is U.S. Slowdown a Blip, or the Beginning?

We fear that the US slowdown we've seen the last 2 Qs (average of $-1 \%$ organic growth vs $12.5 \%$ for the 8 Os prior) has been caused not just by the changes Herbalife has made to its policies (and called out by the company), but also due to a negative shift in representative morale. If we're right and this is partially a morale issue due to the very public nature of the debate on Herbalife, it's something which could potentially snowball creating bigger declines for longer than Herbalife or the market are currently anticipating.

Changes to biz are temporarily slowing sales, according to management. The U.S. business has slowed meaningfully over the past 2Os after holding up surprisingly well the prior 8 quarters, we think because the debate has been waged in the public sphere. We say surprisingly because when distributor morale is negatively impacted, a pronounced drop in sales often follows. Given the very public nature of the debate, one can assume that many if not most of Herbalife's "real" distributors (our classification of the $17 \%$ of distributors who are sales leaders with a downline) are likely to have heard about the debate and could theoretically become less likely to recruit if the future of the company is in question. The increased compliance function may also scare some away from becoming a distributor.

We fear some slowing is rep morale, which can snowball. The pattern that sometimes emerges is: lower morale $\rightarrow$ lower distributor sales $\rightarrow$ higher distributor turnover/lower distributor recruiting $\rightarrow$ lower sales $\rightarrow$ repeat. As a result, a simple
change in morale can have very meaningful impact on the distributor base. It's unclear to us how much of the uptick in US distributor declines during Jun/Sept-Os is due to changed policies (which hurt the short-term but protect the health of the business) versus changes in morale, which can have repercussions that are more lasting. The change in morale could be due to the public debate but it could also be due to the sheer force of recent changes which have to some extent changed the rules of the game and require distributors to adapt their business models, a process that can take time. Note: one of the many million dollar questions to which we will never have an answer is, did Ackman think Herbalife distributors would freeze as the news hit headlines? We suspect he did and was as surprised as we were that the US slowdown was delayed by $\sim 2$ years since he brought Herbalife into the public debate.

We're likely to see rough US results for at least the next 2Qs. Even if the slowdown is $100 \%$ due to changed policies (we find this hard to believe), there would likely still be another 2Os of weakness in the U.S. before we'll see a return to growth on easier comps. The increased focus on Compliance is likely to make distributors more cautious (and therefore less effective...or perhaps less likely to choose Herbalife over other MLMs) and this aspect would perpetuate beyond the four quarters necessary to rebase the business. We don't believe this is in consensus expectations, adding to any potential downside from rep morale related impacts. Herbalife thus far has only discussed the redux to Dec-Q and F15 expectations.

Three-Day Trial Packs just launching in US after Europe success may help. Best practices continue to expand to new markets, even though daily consumption has been a topic of conversation for as long as we can remember. The newest incarnation (for the US - it has already launched in Europe with great success) is a 3-day supply of Formula One shake and Total Control for $\$ 11.95$. Like nutrition clubs, these trial packs increase the addressable audience that can buy products and removes the barriers to consumer adoption. The US launch has been very successful thus far, exceeding initial forecasts and we would expect further global rollout of this initiative to follow.

Daily Nutrition / Nutrition Clubs should continue to help as well. Herbalife has been talking about Daily Nutrition/Nutrition Clubs for as long as we can remember, a trend started in Mexico that has since expanded to an increasing number of markets, with a certain degree of localization in each region. Herbalife has long said that daily consumption / nutrition clubs both help attract customers who otherwise could not afford the product \& support existing users. Best practices continue to evolve with the latest Healthy Active Lifestyle initiative, which may bring additional consumers into the clubs (more of a health focus than weight loss) by expanding the addressable audience.

## Herbalife Executive Team



Michael O. Johnson
(59),Chairman \& CEO


Des Walsh (57),
President
Named CEO in 2003 \&
Chairman in 2007.

Source: Company filings.


Responsible for infrastructure, operations, HR \& IT.

## Guidance

Guidance for fourth quarter $\mathrm{FY}^{\prime} 14$ includes an unfavorable impact from currency rates of approximately $\$ 0.31$ compared to the prior year, inclusive of approximately $\$ 0.22$ from Venezuela. Guidance for FY'15 includes a currency headwind of approximately $\$ 0.66$, including approximately $\$ 0.45$ from Venezuela. Based on current business trends the company's fourth quarter fiscal 2014 and full year fiscal 2015 guidance is as follows:

Volume Point Growth vs 2013, ex. VZ
Volume Point Growth vs 2013
Net Sales Growth vs 2013
Currency Adjusted Net Sales Growth vs 2013
Diluted EPS, excluding items
Currency Adjusted EPS
Cap Ex (\$ millions)
Effective Tax Rate

| Three Months Ending <br> December 31, 2014 |
| :--- |
| $\underline{\underline{\text { Low }}}$ |
| $0.0 \%$ |
| $(3.0 \%)$ |$\quad$| $\underline{\text { High }}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| $(8.0 \%)$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| $1.0 \%$ | $(5.0 \%)$ |
| $\$ 1.30$ | $4.0 \%$ |
| $\$ 1.61$ | $\$ 1.40$ |
| $\$ 52.0$ | $\$ 1.71$ |
| $27.0 \%$ | $29.0 \%$ |


| Twelve Months Ending <br> December 31, 2014 |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Low | High |
| 5.0\% | 6.0\% |
| 2.7\% | 3.5\% |
| 3.5\% | 4.3\% |
| NA | NA |
| \$5.80 | \$5.90 |
| NA | NA |
| \$170.0 | \$180.0 |
| 27.5\% | 29.5\% |


|  | Twelve Months Ending <br> December 31, 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
|  | $\underline{\text { Low }}$ | $\underline{\text { High }}$ |
| Volume Point Growth vs 2014 | $0.0 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |
| Net Sales Growth vs 2014 | $(1.0 \%)$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| Currency Adjusted Net Sales Growth vs 2014 | $3.0 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ |
| Diluted EPS, excluding items | $\$ 5.45$ | $\$ 5.75$ |
| Currency Adjusted EPS | $\$ 6.10$ | $\$ 6.40$ |
| Cap Ex (\$ millions) | $\$ 145.0$ | $\$ 165.0$ |
| Effective Tax Rate | $27.0 \%$ | $29.0 \%$ |
| Free Cash Flow (\$ millions) | $\$ 470.0$ | $\$ 500.0$ |

Note: guidance excludes impact of expenses related to legal and advisory services, expenses related to FTC inquiry, and impact of non-cash interest costs on Convertible

Notes and expenses incurred related to effort to recover costs related to reaudits last year. Forward guidance based on average daily exchange rates of first two weeks of October. Included in guidance is use of GAAP rate for Venezuela of 50 to 1 for balance of year \& all 2015 and excludes potential impact of future devaluation of Venezuelan Bolivar and future repatriation, if any, of existing cash balances in Venezuela.

## Risks

- Elevated volatility due to changes in investor sentiment
- Increased regulatory scrutiny
- Change in regulatory landscape leading to business model changes
- Further declines in sales leader recruitment
- Inability to take pricing at historic levels
- Continued negative publicity via high-profile short-seller
- Negative headwinds from VEN


## Valuation

Stock not always tied to fundamentals but rather debate. The stock can move 15\% in a day, easily, if an activist investor merely indicates he will (at a future point) say something about Herbalife. Any rumors (false or otherwise) about pending FTC action would also cause an unpredictable move. From a pure valuation perspective, our stress tests suggest it's tough to see much downside in most scenarios. In our view, current market implied valuation suggests a meaningfully higher discount rate ( $10 \%+$ ) than we use for peers, a $-1.5 \%$ terminal growth rate and sustained 20bp margin declines to get back to today's trading levels.

## 50\% Relative / 50\% DCF valuation yields a $\$ 55$ price target.

- $\$ 67$ relative value assumes multiple of $12 x$ our NTM EPS estimate of $\$ 5.70$
- $\$ 49$ DCF value assumes flat medium-term organic growth (off LTM-201\$5.0gbn revenues) and average operating margin of 14-15\% (off $\sim 16 \%$ LTM-2014 EBIT margin)

At $\$ 39 /$ sha1re, we believe market discounting -LSD topline $\& \sim 14-15 \%$ op margin.

## THESIS

Thesis. Great industry dynamics \& strong business model but this is not the current focus as stock continues to trade on sentiment, not fundamentals. Importantly, we're confident Herbalife isn't a pyramid scheme, we believe the stock will continue to trade on sentiment, there's sufficient on valuation that even with no clear catalyst, stock looks attractive. We rate Herbalife Buy with a \$55 price target.

## Key Debates:

1) When will fundamental s come back in vogue? On a fundamental view, this is a very attractive business -- great margins, asset light, continued strong recruitment trends. But that is clearly not the investor focus in the short-term, as the stock can move $15 \%$ if an activist shareholder simply indicates he might say something
2) Pyramid scheme or not? Not a pyramid scheme but unclear if/when overhang removed. Civil Investigative Demand (CID) from FTC in March is a request for info, not an inquiry, \& we believe a negative ruling is unlikely. Distributors get no fees for recruiting, minimal start-up cost (<\$100), most income is sales to consumers, \& liberal return policy. Still, nothing requires FTC to decide quickly, in keeping with past precedent, or at all, so overhang remain.
3) Is the $2 Q$ U.S. slowdown a blip or the beginning? $2 Q / 3 Q$ US slowdown may be beginning, not policy changes. New policies still being implemented globally, leading to a redux in $4 Q$ \& F15 guidance. US softness last 2 Qs (avg - $2 \%$ organic vs $10 \%$ for 8 Os prior) was blamed on these changes but may also reflect a shift in morale due to headlines and/or increased compliance hurdles. If either of these is at play, we're likely to see bigger declines for longer than the company or market anticipates.
4) How do you value a stock that trades on sentiment? Short answer, you don't. But even stress testing model by assuming down 1\% organic and $\sim 25$ bp margin contraction p.a beyond $\mathrm{F}_{14}$, it's tough to see downside from current levels.

## Positives/Opportunities:

- "healthy active lifestyle" augments daily consumption methods
- continued global expansion of nutrition clubs
- successful record of R\&D
- High level of internal consumption
- UK still growing $20 \%$ despite being there for $\sim 30$ years
- Significant FCF (although buybacks still restricted)
- FTC could offer a (positive) ruling on pyramid scheme


## Negatives/Risks:

- Stock not always tied to fundamentals but rather debate
- Debate around legality of MLMs
- Cost/distraction of responding to accusations
- FTC Civil Investigative Demand (CID) could take years
- Investigation could be impacting US sales trends
- Tough to assess health of channel/channel inventories

Sales force recruitment/retention

- Fx exposure as 70\% (?) of volume outside US
- Regulatory oversight on formulation, mfg, labeling, mktg


## VALUATION

On fundamentals, it's a great biz, but stock trades mostly on sentiment. Still, you would need to assume significantly higher discount rate than peers, -ve terminal growth and declining margins beyond F14 in our DCF to get to today's levels. On that, we rate Herbalife a Buy with a $\$ 55$ price target.



BACKGROUND


Business Mix: Direct seller of weight management and nutritional supplements as well as energy, sports \& fitness and personal/skincare products. Business has changed overtime, with increased focus today on Weight Management / meal replacement products at $\sim 64 \%$ of the biz vs. $\sim 45 \%$ a decade ago. Herbalife wants to capitalize on the global health and wellness trend, and McKinsey and Euromonitor both estimate $\sim 7 \%$ growth p.a. through 2017, at which point it will be a $\$ 1$ trillion industry.

Geography: Well-diversified, and China's share of revenues have doubled since 2009 while Herbalife has decreased dependence on North America. Herbalife is selling now in 91 countries, with plans to open more in 2014

Ownership: Carl Icahn is Long, Bill Ackman is (vocally) short. One of the most volatile names in HPC, with $42 \%$ short interest as a \% of float.

Input costs/Fx: Largest exposures = soybeans, dairy products, plastics \& transportation related costs. HLF uses long-term supply contracts and supply chain savings to help offset volatlity. Fx was a 1 pt headwind in $\mathrm{CY}_{13}$, but with Venezuela playing a bigger role this year we expect $4.5 \%$ headwind for $\mathrm{CY}_{14}$.

M\&A: Acquisitions have focused mostly on facilities to improve self-manufacturing or innovation capabilities. Winston-Salem, NC (2012) and Micelle Labs in Lake Forest, CA (2009). We don't expect Herbalife to be active in M\&A going forward.

Source: Company Reports, Bloomberg, Euromonitor International (EM participation and category growth rates are both expressed in retail sales dollars), BTIG Research estimates.

|  |  |  |  |  |  | Stock Performance |  |  |  | EPS <br> Momentum |  | NTM Multiples |  |  |  |  | Historical Multiples |  |  |  |  |  | Other |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | YTD |  | LTM |  |  |  | P／E |  |  | EV／EBITDA |  | P／E |  |  | EV／EBITDA |  |  | DEBT | Yields |  | Sentiment |  |  |
|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{5} \\ & \stackrel{y}{N} \\ & \stackrel{y}{3} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \hline 0 \\ & \hline \\ & \sim \\ & \sim \\ & > \\ & > \end{aligned}$ |  | $\circ$ 0 0 0 $\sim$ $>$ $>$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ㄴ } \\ & \text { n } \\ & \text { u } \\ & \text { ㅁ } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Z } \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { 華 } \\ & \text { } \\ & > \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\cup}{\gtrless}$ | I | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{\cup}{\gtrless}$ | 玉 | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{0}{x} \\ & \vdots \\ & 4 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{0}{x} \\ & \geq 2 \\ & \hline 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { خ } \\ & \text { か } \\ & \text { か } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \overline{\bar{\omega}} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\bar{u}$ $\propto$ 0 $\vdots$ - |
| HPC |  |  |  |  |  | －7\％ |  | －1\％ |  | －5\％ | 8\％ | 18x | 2．2x | 8\％ | 11x | 13\％ | 17x | 24x | 8 x | 10x | 10x | 6 x | $1.7 x$ | 5\％ | 2\％ | 44\％ | 11\％ | 57 |
| BEV |  |  |  |  |  | 1\％ |  | 14\％ |  | －3\％ | 8\％ | 19x | $2.7 x$ | 22\％ | 13x | 25\％ | $16 x$ | 22x | 8 x | 10x | 10x | 6 x | $2.5 x$ | 4\％ | 2\％ | 39\％ | 16\％ | 61 |
| ABI BB | \＄179，839 | Neutral | € 89 |  |  | －2\％ | －2\％ | 18\％ | 4\％ | －2\％ | 6\％ | 20x | 3．2x | 21\％ | 12x | 30\％ | 16x | 21x | 5 x | 9 x | 9 x | 3 x | 2．5x | 6\％ | 2\％ | 50\％ | 10\％ | 59 |
| AVP | \＄4，303 | Buy | \＄10 | \＄16 | 64\％ | －15\％ | －8\％ | －41\％ | －40\％ | －9\％ | 7\％ | 11x | 1.7 x | －36\％ | 7 x | －28\％ | 18x | 26 x | 9x | 9x | 9x | $3 x$ | 4．4x | 12\％ | 2\％ | 33\％ | 0\％ | 32 |
| BEI GY | \＄21，712 | Buy | € 69 | €80 | 17\％ | －4\％ | 4\％ | －6\％ | －5\％ | －2\％ | 8\％ | 25x | 3.2 x | 10\％ | 15x | 19\％ | 23x | 29x | 14x | 13x | 13x | 8 x | －1．6x | 1\％ | 1\％ | 37\％ | 22\％ | 68 |
| BF／B | \＄19，994 | Buy | \＄94 | \＄102 | 10\％ | 19\％ | 18\％ | 27\％ | 13\％ | 2\％ | 10\％ | 27x | 2.8 x | 35\％ | 18x | 35\％ | 20x | 28x | 12x | 13 x | 13x | 9 x | $0.5 x$ | 3\％ | 1\％ | 44\％ | 17\％ | 65 |
| CARLB DC | \＄13，470 | Buy | kr． 517 | DKK708 | 38\％ | －10\％ | －11\％ | －9\％ | －23\％ | －9\％ | 7\％ | 13x | 1．9x | －4\％ | 9 x | 7\％ | 14x | $22 x$ | 5 x | 8 x | 8 x | 5 x | 2．6x | 3\％ | 1\％ | 26\％ | 29\％ | 51 |
| CHD | \＄9，930 | Buy | \＄74 | \＄84 | 15\％ | 4\％ | 12\％ | 15\％ | 16\％ | －1\％ | 10\％ | 23x | 2．2x | 25\％ | 13x | 30\％ | 18x | 24x | 12x | 10x | 10x | 8 x | 0．9x | 5\％ | 2\％ | 42\％ | 13\％ | 66 |
| CL | \＄61，948 | Buy | \＄68 | \＄75 | 12\％ | －1\％ | 7\％ | 7\％ | 7\％ | －5\％ | 9\％ | 22x | 2．4x | 7\％ | 14x | 23\％ | 20x | $39 x$ | 13x | 11x | 11x | 8 x | 1．2x | 4\％ | 2\％ | 26\％ | 3\％ | 60 |
| CLX | \＄13，040 | Neutral | \＄101 |  |  | －5\％ | 2\％ | 12\％ | 13\％ | －1\％ | 7\％ | 22x | 3.3 x | 23\％ | 13x | 26\％ | 18x | 29x | 11x | 10x | 10x | 8 x | 1．6x | 5\％ | 3\％ | 10\％ | 35\％ | 60 |
| COTY | \＄6，805 | Buy | \＄19 | \＄23 | 20\％ | －2\％ | 6\％ | 25\％ | 26\％ | 2\％ | 9\％ | 21x | 2．3x | 13\％ | 11x | 19\％ | 19x | 22x | 16x | 10x | 10x | 8 x | 8．4x | 4\％ | 0\％ | 50\％ | 7\％ | 69 |
| DGE LN | \＄74，916 | Buy | 1，905p | 2，042p | 10\％ | －7\％ | －8\％ | －3\％ | －18\％ | －10\％ | 5\％ | 19x | 3．9x | 24\％ | 15x | 23\％ | 15x | 19x | 10x | 12x | $12 x$ | 9 x | $2.3 x$ | 2\％ | 3\％ | 38\％ | 18\％ | 71 |
| EL | \＄27，344 | Buy | \＄72 | \＄85 | 19\％ | －11\％ | －4\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ | －8\％ | 11\％ | 23x | 2．1x | 15\％ | 12x | 20\％ | 20x | 26x | 10x | 10x | 10x | 5 x | 0．0x | 4\％ | 1\％ | 60\％ | 4\％ | 37 |
| ENR | \＄7，732 | Neutral | \＄125 |  |  | －7\％ | 1\％ | 21\％ | 21\％ | －5\％ | 6\％ | 17x | 2．9x | 30\％ | 10x | 24\％ | 13x | 20x | 5 x | 8 x | 8 x | 6 x | 1．8x | 7\％ | 2\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 57 |
| HEIA NA | \＄44，076 | Neutral | € 61 |  |  | 3\％ | 2\％ | 21\％ | 6\％ | 4\％ | 12\％ | 18x | 1.5 x | 25\％ | 10x | 23\％ | 15x | 19x | 8 x | 8 x | 8 x | 5 x | $2.7 x$ | 5\％ | 2\％ | 31\％ | 17\％ | 63 |
| HEN3 GY | \＄43，030 | Neutral | € 83 |  |  | －7\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ | 4\％ | 1\％ | 8\％ | 18x | 2．3x | 20\％ | 11x | 20\％ | 15x | 19x | 8 x | 9 x | 9 x | 6 x | －0．3x | 4\％ | 1\％ | 49\％ | 10\％ | 68 |
| HLF | \＄3，518 | Buy | \＄38 | \＄55 | 45\％ | －27\％ | －20\％ | －43\％ | －42\％ | $-22 \%$ |  | 7 x |  | －45\％ | 6 x | －21\％ | 13x | 21x | 4 x | 7 x | 7 x | 0x | 1．8x | 13\％ | 2\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 38 |
| JAH | \＄8，597 | Buy | \＄67 | \＄78 | 16\％ | －2\％ | 5\％ | 22\％ | 23\％ | 0\％ | 12\％ | 15x | 1．2x | 35\％ | 11x | 41\％ | 11x | 17x | $3 x$ | 8 x | 8 x | 5 x | 5．4x | 4\％ | 0\％ | 82\％ | 6\％ | 69 |
| KMB | \＄42，311 | Neutral | \＄114 |  |  | 6\％ | 13\％ | 13\％ | 14\％ | －7\％ | 7\％ | 19x | $2.5 x$ | 28\％ | 11x | 23\％ | $14 x$ | 19x | 10x | 9 x | 9 x | $7 x$ | 1．3x | 5\％ | 3\％ | 14\％ | 5\％ | 68 |
| NUS | \＄2，329 | Neutral | \＄39 |  |  | －40\％ | －33\％ | －65\％ | －64\％ | －39\％ | 17\％ | 9 x | 0．6x | －32\％ | 5 x | －28\％ | 14x | 23x | 5 x | 7 x | 7 x | 4x | 0．0x |  | 1\％ | 60\％ | 10\％ | 33 |
| NWL | \＄9，619 | Buy | \＄35 | \＄38 | 9\％ | －8\％ | 0\％ | 22\％ | 22\％ | 2\％ | 10\％ | 16x | 1．6x | 20\％ | 11x | 34\％ | 14x | 22 x | 4 x | 9 x | 9 x | 5 x | 2．5x | 5\％ | 2\％ | 83\％ | 0\％ | 62 |
| OR FP | \＄92，752 | Neutral | € 132 |  |  | －6\％ | 1\％ | 7\％ | 8\％ | 0\％ | 8\％ | 22x | $2.7 x$ | 7\％ | 14 x | 5\％ | 21x | 26 x | 13x | 14x | $14 x$ | 9 x | －0．2x | 4\％ | 2\％ | 40\％ | 21\％ | 69 |
| ORI SS | \＄1，017 | Neutral | SEK138 |  |  | －21\％ | $-13 \%$ | －32\％ | －31\％ | 1\％ |  | 12x |  | $-17 \%$ | 8 x | －23\％ | 14x | 20x | 7 x | 10x | 10x | 6 x | 2．2x | 6\％ | 4\％ | 29\％ | 12\％ | 58 |
| PG | \＄237，651 | Buy | \＄88 | \＄92 | 8\％ | －1\％ | 6\％ | 7\％ | 8\％ | －4\％ | 9\％ | 20x | 2.3 x | 5\％ | 13x | 19\％ | 19x | 34 x | 11x | 11x | 11x | 8 x | 1．2x | 5\％ | 3\％ | 45\％ | 6\％ | 57 |
| RB／LN | \＄58，855 | Neutral | 5，230p |  |  | 2\％ | 9\％ | 11\％ | 11\％ | －1\％ | 4\％ | 19x | 5.2 x | 16\％ | 15x | 20\％ | 17x | 22 x | 1 x | 12x | $12 x$ | 9 x | 0．8x | 5\％ | 3\％ | 32\％ | 23\％ | 58 |
| RI FP | \＄30，555 | Neutral | € 92 |  |  | 2\％ | 1\％ | 6\％ | －8\％ | －1\％ | 11\％ | 18x | 1．7x | 18\％ | 13x | 10\％ | 15x | 19x | 8 x | 12x | 12x | $7 x$ | 3．7x | 3\％ |  | 44\％ | 19\％ | 63 |
| SAB LN | \＄88，967 | Neutral | 3，525p |  |  | －3\％ | －4\％ | 11\％ | －3\％ | －5\％ | 7\％ | 21x | $2.8 x$ | 28\％ | $15 x$ | 37\％ | 16x | 22 x | 8 x | 11x | 11x | 6 x | 2.3 x | 4\％ | 2\％ | 29\％ | 21\％ | 56 |
| TAP | \＄14，328 | Neutral | \＄76 |  |  | 5\％ | 4\％ | 45\％ | 30\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ | 18x | 3．8x | 27\％ | 12x | 32\％ | 14 x | 24 x | 10x | 9 x | 9 x | 7 x | 3．2x | 7\％ | 2\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 63 |
| ULVR LN | \＄120，369 | Buy | 2，616p | 3，116p | 23\％ | 3\％ | 11\％ | 9\％ | 10\％ | －1\％ | 8\％ | 19x | 2.5 x | 30\％ | 12x | 20\％ | 15x | 20x | 3 x | 10x | 10x | 7 x | 1．1x | 4\％ | 4\％ | 23\％ | 35\％ | 61 |
|  | 1．2trillion |  |  |  | 22\％ | －5\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ | 0\％ | －5\％ | 8\％ | 18 | $2.5 x$ | 12\％ | 12x | 16\％ | $16 x$ | 23 | 8 x | $10 x$ | 0x | $6 \times$ | 9 | 5\％ | 2\％ | 42\％ | 13\％ |  |

Source：Company Reports，Bloomberg，BTIG Research estimates．
Note：Upside includesprojected dividend
Note：All prices in document are of November 18， 2014

HERBALIFE
Smilions
Income Statement
Net revenues
Cost of goods sold
Gross profit
Selling \& admin expenses Royalty overrides Other operating expenses EBIT (underlying) Memo item: EBITDA Non-recurring items Restructuring charges Gain (loss) on sale of assets Operating profit (rptd)

Interest expense Interest income Other income, net $\frac{\text { Extraordinary items }}{\text { Profit before tax }}$ \begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline Income tax <br>
\hline Net income <br>
\hline

 

\hline Net income <br>
\hline Minority interest <br>
\hline Income avail to common <br>
\hline Diluted share count <br>
\hline
\end{tabular} Diluted share count

$\begin{array}{lllllllllllllllllll}\text { Dec-10 } & \text { Dec-11 } & \text { Dec-12 } & \text { Mar-13 } & \text { Jun-13 } & \text { Sep-13 } & \text { Dec-13 } & \text { Dec-13 } & \text { Mar-14 } & \text { Jun-14 } & \text { Sep-14 } & \text { Dec-14 } & \text { Dec-14 } & \text { Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15 } & \text { Dec-15 } & \text { Dec-15 } & \text { Dec-16 } & \text { Dec-17 } & \text { Dec-18 }\end{array}$


## E.P.S. (reported) <br> E.P.S. (underlyin

Inc Statement Ratios
Growth Analysis (\%)
Net revenues
Gross profit
EBIT (underlying)
Net income
E.P.S. (reported)

Profitability (\%)
Gross profit margin
EBIT margin (underlying)
Margin $\Delta$ (bps) Gross profit margin delta EBIT margin delta
Cost Analysis (\%)
Cost of goods sold Selling, gen \& admin expenses Royalty overrides
Interest Rates \& Taxes (\%) Interest rate on debt Interest yield on cash
Reported tax rate Effective tax rate Tax on exceptional items Dividend Policy Cash dividends per share Dividend payout ratio $\begin{array}{llllllll}\text { Dec-10 } & \text { Dec-11 } & \text { Dec-12 } & \text { Mar-13 } & \text { Jun-13 } & \text { Sep-13 } & \text { Dec-13 } & \text { Dec-13 }\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{llllllll}\text { FY10A } & \text { FY11A } & \text { FY12A } & \text { 1Q13A } & \text { 2Q13A } & \text { 3Q13A } & \text { 4Q13A } & \text { FY13 A }\end{array}$

| $17.6 \%$ |
| ---: |
| $19.0 \%$ |

$\square$
$19.0 \%$
$35.1 \%$

| $35.9 \%$ | $31.9 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $44.8 \%$ | $42.1 \%$ |


| $17.9 \%$ |
| :--- |
| $17.5 \%$ |
| $17.6 \%$ |
| $15.8 \%$ |


| $16.5 \%$ | $18.1 \%$ | $19.3 \%$ | $19.8 \%$ | $18.5 \%$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $16.9 \%$ | $17.4 \%$ | $19.6 \%$ | $21.8 \%$ | $19.0 \%$ |
| $25.6 \%$ | $9.2 \%$ | $27.2 \%$ | $23.9 \%$ | $20.9 \%$ |
| $9.9 \%$ | $7.3 \%$ | $20.5 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $10.5 \%$ |
| $24.4 \%$ | $21.8 \%$ | $27.1 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ | $20.7 \%$ |
| $43.7 \%$ | $28.4 \%$ | $36.1 \%$ | $21.9 \%$ | $32.1 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $79.9 \%$ | $79.7 \%$ | $80.4 \%$ | $81.4 \%$ | $80.4 \%$ |
| $17.2 \%$ | $16.7 \%$ | $16.9 \%$ | $15.6 \%$ | $16.6 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 bp | -53 bp | 18 bp | 135 bp | 32 bp |
| 124 bp | -137 bp | 104 bp | 52 bp | 34 bp |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $20.1 \%$ | $20.3 \%$ | $19.6 \%$ | $18.6 \%$ | $19.6 \%$ |
| $30.3 \%$ | $31.9 \%$ | $32.7 \%$ | $35.8 \%$ | $32.8 \%$ |
| $32.4 \%$ | $31.1 \%$ | $30.8 \%$ | $30.0 \%$ | $31.0 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $3.7 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ | $3.7 \%$ |
| $1.1 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| $27.3 \%$ | $23.4 \%$ | $24.3 \%$ | $31.0 \%$ | $26.4 \%$ |
| $27.1 \%$ | $23.9 \%$ | $24.0 \%$ | $29.6 \%$ | $26.1 \%$ |
| $25.3 \%$ | $32.2 \%$ | $19.4 \%$ | $14.8 \%$ | $22.9 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $\$ 0.29$ | $\$ 0.29$ | $\$ 0.29$ | $\$ 0.28$ | $\$ 1.14$ |
| $23 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $21 \%$ |


| 1,187 | \$5,012 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\underline{220}$ | 976 |
| 966 | 4,035 |
| 436 | 1,749 |
| 356 | 1,492 |
| $\bigcirc$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| 174 | 794 |
| 198 | 888 |
| 0 | -269 |
| 0 | 0 |
| $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| 174 | 526 |
| -14 | -55 |
| 4 | 14 |
| 0 | 0 |
| 0 | -38 |
| 164 | 446 |


| \$1,269 | \$4,825 | \$1,263 | \$1,306 | \$1,2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 236 | 947 | 251 | 257 | 2 |
| 1,033 | 3,878 | 1,011 | 1,049 | 1,0 |
| 454 | 1,580 | 408 | 448 | 4 |
| 381 | 1,498 | 382 | 391 | 3 |
| 0 | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | 0 |  |
| 198 | 800 | 222 | 210 | 1 |
| 219 | 885 | 243 | 234 | 2 |
| -16 | -65 | -95 | -14 | -1 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 0 | $\underline{0}$ | - | $\underline{0}$ |  |
| 182 | 735 | 128 | 196 |  |
| -6 | -27 | -12 | -15 |  |
| 3 | 8 | 3 | 3 |  |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 0 | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{-9}$ | -9 |  |
| 179 | 717 | 109 | 175 |  |


| $\$ 2,734$ | $\$ 3,455$ | $\$ 4,072$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\underline{546}$ | $\underline{680}$ | $\underline{813}$ |
| 2,188 | 2,774 | 3,260 |
| 876 | 1,075 | 1,260 |
| 900 | 1,138 | 1,339 |
| $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| 412 | 562 | 661 |
| 480 | 634 | 736 |
| -24 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| 388 | 562 | 661 |
| -10 | -9 | -17 |
| 2 | 7 | 6 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{-1}$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| 380 | 560 | 651 |
| 90 | 148 | 174 |
| 1 | 412 | 477 |


| 185 | 55 | -13 | 49 | 126 |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 528 | 75 | 120 | 11 | 115 | 320 |
|  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |

Source: BTIG Research Estimates

HERBALIFE
$\$$ millions
Balance Shee
Cash \& cash equivalents Accounts receivable Inventories
Other current assets
Current assets
Net property, plant, \& equip Goodwill \& intangible assets Deferred assets Other non-current assets Non-current assets

Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 $\quad$ Dec-13 $\quad$ Mar-14 Jun-14 $\quad$ Sep-14 $\quad$ Dec-14 $\quad$ Dec-14 $\quad$ Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 Dec-15 Dec-16 $\quad$ Dec-17 Dec-18 | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 | Sep-14 | Dec-14 | Dec-14 | Mar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-16 | Dec-17 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| FY10A | FY11A | FY12A | $1 Q 13 A$ | $2 Q 13 A$ | $3 Q 13 A$ | $4 Q 13 A$ | FY13A | $1 Q 14 A$ | $2 Q 14 A$ | $3 Q 14 A$ | $4 Q 14 E$ | FY14E | $1 Q 15 E$ | $2 Q 15 E$ | $3 Q 15 E$ | $4 Q 15 E$ | FY15E | FY16E | FY17E |

| Total assets | 1,232 | 1,446 | 1,704 | 2,089 | 2,254 | 2,343 | 2,474 | 2,474 | 2,857 | 2,436 | 2,364 | 2,303 | 2,303 | 2,408 | 2,434 | 2,431 | 2,387 | 2,387 | 2,450 | 2,491 | 2,516 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Shor-term debt | 3 | 2 | 56 | 63 | 69 | 75 | 81 | 81 | 88 | 94 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Accounts payable | 255 | 286 | 352 | 341 | 387 | 424 | 462 | 462 | 439 | 474 | 452 | 439 | 439 | 454 | 483 | 460 | 454 | 454 | 455 | 453 | 450 |
| Royalty overrides | 162 | 198 | 243 | 222 | 236 | 253 | 267 | 267 | 260 | 253 | 258 | 250 | 250 | 262 | 251 | 255 | 251 | 251 | 252 | 251 | 249 |
| Other current liabilities | 51 | $\underline{63}$ | $\underline{65}$ | 71 | 100 | 116 | 112 | 112 | 116 | 121 | 118 | 105 | 105 | 117 | 120 | 117 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 104 |
| Current liabilities | 471 | 549 | 717 | 697 | 792 | 868 | 922 | 922 | 902 | 942 | 928 | 794 | 794 | 833 | 854 | 832 | 810 | 810 | 812 | 809 | 804 |
| Long-term debt | 175 | 202 | 431 | 913 | 894 | 875 | 850 | 850 | 1,761 | 1,744 | 1,728 | 1,696 | 1,696 | 1,666 | 1,588 | 1,534 | 1,465 | 1,465 | 1,221 | 954 | 670 |
| Deferred tax liabilities | 76 | 96 | 92 | 92 | 93 | 100 | 103 | 103 | 104 | 102 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 |
| Other non-current liabs | $\underline{23}$ | 39 | $\underline{43}$ | $\underline{45}$ | $\underline{41}$ | 45 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 51 | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{62}$ | 62 | $\underline{62}$ | 62 | 62 | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{62}$ |
| Non-current liabilities | 274 | 337 | 566 | 1,049 | 1,028 | 1,020 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,913 | 1,897 | 1,857 | 1,825 | 1,825 | 1,796 | 1,717 | 1,663 | 1,595 | 1,595 | 1,350 | 1,083 | 799 |
| Capital | 257 | 408 | 304 | 299 | 306 | 305 | 324 | 324 | 424 | 399 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 | 407 |
| Retained earnings | 257 | 306 | 148 | 85 | 172 | 178 | 247 | 247 | -359 | -780 | -769 | -663 | -663 | -519 | -386 | -262 | -166 | -166 | 340 | 850 | 1,364 |
| Treasury stock | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -50 | -100 | -150 | -200 | -200 | -400 | -600 | -800 |
| Reserves \& other items | -27 | -38 | -32 | -42 | -44 | -27 | -20 | -20 | -22 | -23 | -59 | -59 | -59 | -59 | $\underline{-59}$ | -59 | -59 | -59 | -59 | -59 | -59 |
| Shareholders' equity | 487 | 676 | 421 | 343 | 434 | 456 | 551 | 551 | 42 | -404 | -421 | -315 | -315 | -221 | -137 | -64 | -18 | -18 | 288 | 598 | 912 |
| Total liabs \& equity | 1,232 | 1,562 | 1,704 | 2,089 | 2,254 | 2,343 | 2,474 | 2,474 | 2,857 | 2,436 | 2,364 | 2,303 | 2,303 | 2,408 | 2,434 | 2,431 | 2,387 | 2,387 | 2,450 | 2,491 | 2,516 |


| HERBALIFE | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 | Sep-14 | Dec-14 | Dec-14 | Mar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-16 | Dec-17 | Dec-18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Balance Sheet Ratios | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1Q13 A | 2Q13 A | 3 Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14E | 1Q15 E | 2Q15 E | 301 | 4015 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 |  |


| Tradio | FY10 A | FY11 | FY12 A | 1013 A | 2 a 3 A | , | 4013 A | FY13 | 1014 A | 2a14 | A | 4014 | FV14 | 1015 E | 2a15 E | 3015 | 发 | , |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net Trading Cycle |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Receivables days | 11 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Inventory days | 122 | 133 | 152 | 135 | 122 | 133 | 136 | 135 | 118 | 122 | 136 | 136 | 123 | 118 | 122 | 136 | 136 | 124 | 123 | 123 | 123 |
| Payable days | 65 | 60 | 62 | 55 | 56 | 61 | 61 | 67 | 61 | 61 | 59 | 61 | 59 | 61 | 61 | 59 | 61 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 |
| Royalty overrides | $\underline{66}$ | $\underline{63}$ | $\underline{66}$ | 56 | 57 | $\underline{62}$ | $\underline{64}$ | 65 | $\underline{62}$ | 59 | $\underline{65}$ | $\underline{64}$ | 61 | $\underline{62}$ | 59 | 65 | $\underline{64}$ | 61 | $\underline{61}$ | $\underline{61}$ | $\underline{61}$ |
| Net trading cycle | 2 | 19 | 35 | 34 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 11 | 4 | 9 | 20 | 18 | 10 | 4 | 9 | 20 | 18 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Working Capital |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current assets (ex-cash) | \$405 | \$510 | \$630 | \$624 | \$654 | \$686 | \$670 | \$670 | \$674 | \$721 | \$759 | \$708 | \$708 | \$733 | \$729 | \$749 | \$710 | \$710 | \$712 | \$710 | \$706 |
| Non-interest bearing liabs | 468 | 547 | 661 | 634 | 723 | 793 | 841 | 841 | 814 | 849 | 828 | 794 | 794 | 833 | 854 | 832 | 810 | 810 | 812 | 809 | 804 |
| Working Capital | -63 | -37 | -30 | -11 | -69 | -107 | -171 | -171 | -140 | -127 | -69 | -86 | -86 | -100 | -126 | -83 | -100 | -100 | -100 | -99 | -98 |
| Working capital \% of sales | -2.3\% | -1.1\% | -0.7\% | -0.2\% | -1.4\% | -2.2\% | -3.4\% | -3.5\% | -2.8\% | -2.4\% | -1.4\% | -1.8\% | -1.7\% | -2.0\% | -2.4\% | -1.7\% | -2.1\% | -2.0\% | -2.0\% | -2.0\% | -2.0\% |
| Capital Structure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Short-term debt | \$3 | \$2 | \$56 | \$63 | \$69 | \$75 | \$81 | \$81 | \$88 | \$94 | \$100 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Long-term debt | 175 | 202 | 431 | 913 | 894 | 875 | 850 | 850 | 1,761 | 1,744 | 1,728 | 1,696 | 1,696 | 1,666 | 1,588 | 1,534 | 1,465 | 1,465 | 1,221 | 954 | 670 |
| Total debt | 178 | 204 | 488 | 975 | 963 | 950 | 931 | 931 | 1,848 | 1,838 | 1,828 | 1,696 | 1,696 | 1,666 | 1,588 | 1,534 | 1,465 | 1,465 | 1,221 | 954 | 670 |
| Other non-current liabs | 23 | 39 | 43 | 45 | 41 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 51 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 |
| Shareholders' equity | 487 | 676 | 421 | 343 | 434 | 456 | 551 | 551 | 42 | -404 | -421 | -315 | -315 | -221 | -137 | -64 | -18 | -18 | 288 | 598 | 912 |
| Total capital | 689 | 919 | 951 | 1,363 | 1,438 | 1,451 | 1,530 | 1,530 | 1,938 | 1,485 | 1,469 | 1,442 | 1,442 | 1,507 | 1,512 | 1,531 | 1,509 | 1,509 | 1,571 | 1,614 | 1,644 |
| Total debt \% total capital | 25.9\% | 22.2\% | 51.3\% | 71.6\% | 67.0\% | 65.5\% | 60.9\% | 60.9\% | 95.3\% | 123.7\% | 124.4\% | 117.6\% | 117.6\% | 110.6\% | 105.0\% | 100.2\% | 97.1\% | 97.1\% | 77.8\% | 59.1\% | 40.8\% |
| Cash on B/S as \% sales | 7.0\% | 7.5\% | 8.2\% | 16.1\% | 17.4\% | 18.4\% | 19.2\% | 20.2\% | 25.0\% | 14.8\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 12.8\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 12.9\% | 12.8\% | 12.8\% | 12.8\% |
| Net debt | -\$12 | -\$55 | \$154 | \$253 | \$113 | \$58 | -\$42 | -\$42 | \$586 | \$1,064 | \$1,150 | \$1,055 | \$1,055 | \$980 | \$889 | \$862 | \$821 | \$821 | \$576 | \$311 | \$31 |
| Net debt \% total capital | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 25.0\% | 39.5\% | 19.2\% | 10.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 86.7\% | 149.5\% | 145.4\% | 131.6\% | 131.6\% | 119.4\% | 109.3\% | 100.3\% | 94.9\% | 94.9\% | 62.2\% | 32.0\% | 3.0\% |
| Credit Ratios |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NBIT / net finance costs | 43.0x | 63.6x | 40.0x | 34.3 x | 30.7 x | 30.4 x | 30.4x | 30.4 x | 26.0x | 21.4x | 17.7x | 14.6x | 14.6x | 14.1x | 14.3x | 14.4x | 14.7x | 14.7x | 17.3 x | 21.1x | 27.6x |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.2 x | 0.3x | 0.1x | 0.1x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.6x | 1.2x | 1.3x | 1.2x | 1.2x | 1.1x | 1.0x | 1.0x | 1.0x | 1.0x | 0.7x | 0.4 x | 0.0x |

Source: BTIG Research Estimates

| HERBALIFE | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 | Sep-14 | Dec-14 | Dec-14 | Mar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-16 | Dec-17 | Dec-18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ millions | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1Q13 A | 2 Q13 A | 3Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14 E | 1Q15 E | 2 Q15 E | 3Q15 E | 4Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18 E |
| Cash Flow Statement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net income | \$291 | \$413 | \$477 | \$119 | \$143 | \$142 | \$124 | \$528 | \$75 | \$120 | \$11 | \$115 | \$320 | \$137 | \$125 | \$111 | \$105 | \$478 | \$487 | \$492 | \$495 |
| Depreciation | 69 | 72 | 74 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 85 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 93 | 26 | 28 | 30 | 30 | 114 | 133 | 147 | 158 |
| Restructuring, net of cash | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stock-based compensation | 7 | -3 | -2 | 7 | 8 | 9 | -11 | 14 | 8 | 9 | 14 | -9 | 21 | 7 | 8 | 12 | -8 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| Deferred income taxes | -25 | -13 | -9 | -4 | -4 | 0 | -17 | -25 | -2 | -6 | -51 | 0 | -59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pension benefits contribution | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other items | 11 | 14 | 4 | 10 | 16 | -7 | $\underline{20}$ | 39 | 112 | 12 | 160 | $\underline{\square}$ | $\underline{284}$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\underline{\square}$ | - | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{1}$ | $\underline{0}$ | 0 | $\underline{0}$ |
| Operating cash flow | 352 | 482 | 545 | 154 | 184 | 166 | 137 | 640 | 214 | 158 | 158 | 130 | 659 | 170 | 162 | 153 | 126 | 611 | 639 | 658 | 672 |
| Accounts receivable | -8 | -10 | -28 | 3 | -4 | 2 | 8 | 9 | -18 | 17 | -4 | 7 | 1 | -26 | 17 | 3 | 5 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Inventories | -32 | -85 | -82 | -2 | -13 | -6 | -20 | -40 | 14 | -17 | -56 | 39 | -19 | 1 | -13 | -24 | 34 | -2 | -1 | 1 | 2 |
| Accounts payable | 38 | 44 | 56 | -11 | 59 | 26 | 22 | 97 | -6 | 36 | -2 | -13 | 15 | 15 | 29 | -23 | -6 | 14 | 1 | -2 | -3 |
| Royalty overrides | 16 | 44 | 42 | -21 | 19 | 16 | 15 | 29 | -4 | -8 | 16 | -8 | -4 | 12 | -11 | 4 | -4 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -2 |
| Other curr assets, net of liabs | 14 | 34 | 35 | $\underline{14}$ | -32 | $\underline{22}$ | $\underline{34}$ | 38 | -9 | -29 | -10 | $\underline{-9}$ | -56 | 12 | 4 | -3 | -12 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 1 |
| Net working investment | 28 | 28 | 23 | -16 | 30 | 60 | 59 | 133 | -23 | -1 | -56 | 17 | -64 | 14 | 26 | -42 | 17 | 14 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Cash from operations | 380 | 509 | 568 | 138 | 214 | 226 | 196 | 773 | 191 | 157 | 102 | 146 | 596 | 184 | 188 | 111 | 143 | 625 | 638 | 657 | 671 |
| Capital expenditures | -68 | -90 | -122 | -25 | -31 | -36 | -55 | -147 | -59 | -47 | -34 | -52 | -192 | -59 | -47 | -34 | -52 | -192 | -192 | -192 | -191 |
| Acquisitions of businesses | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Disposals of assets | -1 | -2 | - 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - 4 | -4 | $\underline{-3}$ | - 4 | -4 | 0 | -12 | 0 | 0 | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | 0 | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | O |
| Cash from investing | -69 | -92 | -125 | -25 | -31 | -36 | -59 | -151 | -62 | -51 | -39 | -52 | -203 | -59 | -47 | -34 | -52 | -192 | -192 | -192 | -191 |
| Issuance (repay) debt | -72 | 20 | 280 | 488 | -13 | -12 | -19 | 444 | 1,102 | -19 | -19 | -132 | 933 | -29 | -79 | -54 | -68 | -230 | -244 | -267 | -284 |
| Capital increase | 32 | 50 | 41 | 1 | 0 | -3 | 18 | 17 | -117 | 5 | -2 | 0 | -114 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Treasury stock | -160 | -322 | -557 | -164 | -1 | -110 | -31 | -306 | -695 | -583 | 0 | 0 | -1,278 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -200 | -200 | -200 | -200 |
| Dividends | -54 | $\underline{-85}$ | -135 | -31 | -31 | -31 | -30 | -123 | -30 | 0 | 0 | $\underline{0}$ | -30 | O | $\underline{0}$ | O | O | 0 | O | 0 | O |
| Cash from financing | -254 | -338 | -371 | 293 | -45 | -156 | -62 | 31 | 260 | -597 | -21 | -132 | -490 | -79 | -129 | -104 | -118 | -430 | -444 | -467 | -484 |
| Net effect of exchange rates | -17 | -11 | 3 | -17 | -11 | 9 | 5 | -13 | -100 | 3 | -137 | 0 | -235 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Change in cash | 40 | 68 | 75 | 389 | 127 | 43 | 80 | 639 | 289 | -488 | -95 | -38 | -332 | 46 | 12 | -27 | -27 | 4 | 1 | -2 | -4 |
| Beginning cash on $\mathrm{B} / \mathrm{S}$ | 151 | 191 | 259 | 334 | 722 | 850 | 893 | 334 | 973 | 1,262 | 774 | 678 | 973 | 641 | 687 | 699 | 671 | 641 | 644 | 646 | 644 |
| Ending cash on $\mathrm{B} / \mathrm{S}$ | 191 | 259 | 334 | 722 | 850 | 893 | 973 | 973 | 1,262 | 774 | 678 | 641 | 641 | 687 | 699 | 671 | 644 | 644 | 646 | 644 | 640 |
| herbalife | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 | Sep-14 | Dec-14 | Dec-14 | Mar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-16 | Dec-17 | Dec-18 |
| Cash Flow Ratios | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1Q13 A | 2Q13 A | 3Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3 Q 14 A | 4Q14E | FY14E | 1Q15 E | 2 Q 15 E | 3Q15 E | 4Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18 E |
| Earnings Quality |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OCF / net income (underlying | 119\% | 117\% | 114\% | 112\% | 122\% | 109\% | 100\% | 111\% | 141\% | 112\% | 126\% | 113\% | 124\% | 124\% | 129\% | 137\% | 121\% | 128\% | 131\% | 134\% | 136\% |
| CFO / net income | 128\% | 123\% | 119\% | 100\% | 142\% | 148\% | 143\% | 134\% | 126\% | 111\% | 82\% | 127\% | 112\% | 135\% | 149\% | 99\% | 137\% | 131\% | 131\% | 134\% | 136\% |
| FCF / net income | 105\% | 101\% | 94\% | 82\% | 121\% | 125\% | 103\% | 108\% | 87\% | 78\% | 54\% | 83\% | 76\% | 92\% | 112\% | 69\% | 87\% | 91\% | 92\% | 95\% | 97\% |
| Investment Rates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NWI \% sales | 1.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.6\% | -1.5\% | 2.5\% | 4.9\% | 4.7\% | 2.8\% | -1.8\% | -0.1\% | -4.5\% | 1.4\% | -1.3\% | 1.1\% | 2.0\% | -3.4\% | 1.4\% | 0.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Capex \% sales | -2.5\% | -2.6\% | -3.0\% | -2.2\% | -2.6\% | -2.9\% | -4.3\% | -3.0\% | -4.6\% | -3.6\% | -2.7\% | -4.3\% | -3.8\% | -4.6\% | -3.6\% | -2.7\% | -4.3\% | -3.8\% | -3.8\% | -3.8\% | -3.8\% |
| Cash on $\mathrm{B} / \mathrm{S} \%$ sales | 7.0\% | 7.5\% | 8.2\% | 16.1\% | 17.4\% | 18.4\% | 19.2\% | 20.2\% | 25.0\% | 14.8\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 12.8\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 12.9\% | 12.8\% | 12.8\% | 12.8\% |
| Fixed Assets Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Capex / depreciation | 99\% | 126\% | 163\% | 119\% | 146\% | 171\% | 256\% | 173\% | 275\% | 200\% | 141\% | 213\% | 205\% | 226\% | 164\% | 115\% | 174\% | 168\% | 145\% | 130\% | 121\% |
| Depreciation \% fixed assets | 38.6\% | 38.7\% | 34.1\% | 34.3\% | 34.0\% | 32.0\% | 29.4\% | 30.2\% | 25.6\% | 26.5\% | 27.0\% | 27.0\% | 26.5\% | 27.0\% | 27.0\% | 27.0\% | 27.0\% | 26.8\% | 26.9\% | 27.0\% | 27.1\% |
| Sales / net pp\&e | 15.4x | 18.6x | 18.7x | 18.4x | 19.4 x | 18.6x | 17.3x | 17.2x | 15.2x | 14.7x | 13.9x | 12.7x | 14.2x | 12.6x | 12.1x | 11.3x | 10.5x | 11.8x | 10.2x | $9.2 x$ | 8.5 x |
| Free Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating cash flow | \$352 | \$482 | \$545 | \$154 | \$184 | \$166 | \$137 | \$640 | \$214 | \$158 | \$158 | \$130 | \$659 | \$170 | \$162 | \$153 | \$126 | \$611 | \$639 | \$658 | \$672 |
| Net working investment | 28 | 28 | 23 | -16 | 30 | 60 | 59 | 133 | -23 | -1 | -56 | 17 | -64 | 14 | 26 | -42 | 17 | 14 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Capital expenditures | -68 | -90 | -122 | -25 | -31 | -36 | -55 | -147 | -59 | -47 | -34 | -52 | -192 | -59 | -47 | -34 | -52 | -192 | -192 | -192 | -191 |
| Free cash flow | 312 | 419 | 446 | 113 | 183 | 190 | 141 | 626 | 132 | 110 | 67 | 95 | 404 | 125 | 141 | 76 | 91 | 434 | 446 | 465 | 480 |
| Dividend payments | -54 | -85 | -135 | -31 | -31 | -31 | -30 | -123 | -30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share repurchases | -160 | -322 | -557 | $\underline{-164}$ | -1 | -110 | -31 | -306 | -695 | -583 | $\underline{0}$ | $\underline{0}$ | -1,278 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -50 | -200 | -200 | -200 | -200 |
| Cash available for debt repa | 99 | 12 | -246 | -83 | 150 | 49 | 80 | 196 | -593 | -473 | 67 | 95 | -905 | 75 | 91 | 26 | 41 | 234 | 246 | 265 | 280 |
| Share Repurchase |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cost of shares repurchased | \$150 | \$308 | \$528 | \$162 | \$0 | \$109 | \$25 | \$296 | \$686 | \$581 | \$0 | \$0 | \$1,267 | \$50 | \$50 | \$50 | \$50 | \$200 | \$200 | \$200 | \$200 |
| Number of shares repurchase | 2.9 | 5.5 | 11.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 6.0 | 9.9 | 9.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
| Avg price shares repurchase | \$52.3 | \$55.9 | \$47.8 | \$40.6 | \$0.0 | \$63.9 | \$74.0 | \$49.0 | \$69.0 | \$59.4 | \$60.6 | \$61.8 | \$64.3 | \$63.0 | \$64.3 | \$65.6 | \$66.9 | \$64.9 | \$70.3 | \$76.1 | \$82.3 |


| HERBALIFE | Dec-10 | Dec-11 | Dec-12 | Mar-13 | Jun-13 | Sep-13 | Dec-13 | Dec-13 | Mar-14 | Jun-14 | Sep-14 | Dec-14 | Dec-14 | Mar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-15 | Dec-16 | Dec-17 | Dec-18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ millions | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1Q13 A | 2Q13 A | 3Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14 E | 1 Q 15 E | 2 Q 15 E | 3Q15 E | 4Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18E |
| Revenue Build-Up |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net revenues | \$2,734 | \$3,455 | \$4,072 | \$1,124 | \$1,219 | \$1,214 | \$1,269 | \$4,825 | \$1,263 | \$1,306 | \$1,256 | \$1,187 | \$5,012 | \$1,272 | \$1,295 | \$1,244 | \$1,193 | \$5,004 | \$5,026 | \$5,020 | \$4,996 |
| \% reported | 17.6\% | 26.3\% | 17.9\% | 16.5\% | 18.1\% | 19.3\% | 19.8\% | 18.5\% | 12.4\% | 7.1\% | 3.5\% | -6.5\% | 3.9\% | 0.8\% | -0.9\% | -1.0\% | 0.6\% | -0.2\% | 0.4\% | -0.1\% | -0.5\% |
| \% volume | 13.9\% | 21.3\% | 20.4\% | 13.4\% | 13.5\% | 12.8\% | 12.7\% | 13.1\% | 9.2\% | 4.9\% | 0.3\% | -3.0\% | 2.7\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.8\% |
| \% pricing | 3.5\% | 1.5\% | 2.2\% | 4.1\% | 3.9\% | 7.7\% | 9.4\% | 6.3\% | 7.7\% | 5.9\% | 6.0\% | 3.3\% | 5.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| \% organic | 17.4\% | 22.8\% | 22.6\% | 17.5\% | 17.4\% | 20.5\% | 22.0\% | 19.4\% | 16.9\% | 10.8\% | 6.3\% | 0.4\% | 8.4\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.8\% |
| \% currency | 0.2\% | 3.5\% | -4.7\% | -1.0\% | 0.7\% | -1.2\% | -2.2\% | -0.9\% | -4.5\% | -3.7\% | -2.8\% | -7.0\% | -4.5\% | -2.0\% | -3.1\% | -2.4\% | 0.0\% | -1.9\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| \% acquisitions | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Revenue Breakout |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | \$614 | \$699 | \$841 | \$221 | \$248 | \$229 | \$210 | \$908 | \$248 | \$251 | \$223 | \$208 | \$930 | \$234 | \$245 | \$217 | \$202 | \$897 | \$868 | \$847 | \$831 |
| Mexico | 334 | 437 | 496 | 133 | 146 | 141 | 143 | 562 | 143 | 149 | 144 | 139 | 574 | 136 | 135 | 136 | 136 | 542 | 530 | 517 | 504 |
| South \& Central America | 390 | 554 | 689 | 220 | 222 | 241 | 290 | 973 | 245 | 203 | 205 | 208 | 861 | 236 | 202 | 208 | 206 | 853 | 839 | 820 | 798 |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 528 | 615 | 628 | 170 | 186 | 182 | 198 | 735 | 211 | 227 | 204 | 212 | 855 | 223 | 244 | 233 | 244 | 944 | 1,001 | 1,025 | 1,027 |
| Asia-Pacific | 683 | 939 | 1,140 | 312 | 299 | 284 | 280 | 1,175 | 280 | 306 | 298 | 278 | 1,162 | 290 | 280 | 261 | 256 | 1,087 | 1,093 | 1,093 | 1,089 |
| China | 184 | 211 | 279 | 68 | 118 | 137 | 148 | 472 | 136 | 170 | 181 | 142 | 629 | 154 | 189 | 189 | 150 | 681 | 694 | 718 | 747 |
| Total revenues | 2,734 | 3,455 | 4,072 | 1,124 | 1,219 | 1,214 | 1,269 | 4,825 | 1,263 | 1,306 | 1,256 | 1,187 | 5,012 | 1,272 | 1,295 | 1,244 | 1,193 | 5,004 | 5,026 | 5,020 | 4,996 |
| Reported Growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 16.1\% | 13.8\% | 20.4\% | 5.1\% | 10.2\% | 9.5\% | 6.7\% | 7.9\% | 11.9\% | 1.2\% | -2.3\% | -0.9\% | 2.5\% | -5.7\% | -2.3\% | -3.1\% | -3.2\% | -3.6\% | -3.2\% | -2.4\% | -1.9\% |
| Mexico | 27.0\% | 30.8\% | 13.5\% | 13.5\% | 21.9\% | 10.8\% | 8.0\% | 13.4\% | 7.4\% | 2.1\% | 1.9\% | -2.6\% | 2.1\% | -4.9\% | -9.5\% | -5.4\% | -2.1\% | -5.5\% | -2.3\% | -2.4\% | -2.5\% |
| South \& Central America | 6.4\% | 42.0\% | 24.2\% | 32.7\% | 45.7\% | 44.0\% | 42.8\% | 41.3\% | 11.4\% | -8.5\% | -14.9\% | -28.5\% | -11.6\% | -3.5\% | -0.5\% | 1.4\% | -0.7\% | -0.9\% | -1.6\% | -2.4\% | -2.7\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 4.7\% | 16.6\% | 2.1\% | 10.1\% | 15.3\% | 23.2\% | 20.0\% | 17.1\% | 24.5\% | 22.0\% | 12.5\% | 7.1\% | 16.2\% | 5.4\% | 7.3\% | 14.1\% | 15.3\% | 10.4\% | 6.1\% | 2.4\% | 0.2\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 34.2\% | 37.3\% | 21.4\% | 19.9\% | 0.9\% | -1.5\% | -5.3\% | 3.0\% | -10.0\% | 2.4\% | 4.9\% | -0.7\% | -1.0\% | 3.4\% | -8.5\% | -12.5\% | -7.8\% | -6.5\% | 0.6\% | -0.1\% | -0.3\% |
| China | 21.1\% | 14.3\% | 32.1\% | 20.2\% | 53.3\% | 76.5\% | 121.2\% | 69.3\% | 98.5\% | 43.9\% | 32.6\% | -4.2\% | 33.4\% | 13.4\% | 11.1\% | 4.3\% | 5.1\% | 8.3\% | 1.8\% | 3.5\% | 4.0\% |
| Reported growth | 17.6\% | 26.3\% | 17.9\% | 16.5\% | 18.1\% | 19.3\% | 19.8\% | 18.5\% | 12.4\% | 7.1\% | 3.5\% | -6.5\% | 3.9\% | 0.8\% | -0.9\% | -1.0\% | 0.6\% | -0.2\% | 0.4\% | -0.1\% | -0.5\% |
| Constant Currency Growt | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1013 A | 2013 A | 3013 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2 Q 14 A | 3 Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14E | 1015 E | 2 Q 15 E | 3015 E | 4Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18 E |
| North America | 15.8\% | 13.6\% | 20.5\% | 5.1\% | 10.2\% | 9.6\% | 6.9\% | 8.0\% | 12.1\% | 1.3\% | -2.2\% | -0.9\% | 2.6\% | -5.7\% | -2.3\% | -3.1\% | -3.2\% | -3.6\% | -3.2\% | -2.4\% | -1.9\% |
| Mexico | 19.2\% | 28.6\% | 20.4\% | 10.5\% | 12.4\% | 8.7\% | 8.6\% | 10.0\% | 12.4\% | 6.5\% | 3.5\% | 1.1\% | 5.8\% | -3.0\% | -5.8\% | -2.7\% | -2.1\% | -3.4\% | -2.2\% | -2.4\% | -2.5\% |
| South \& Central America | 18.5\% | 36.7\% | 33.4\% | 40.5\% | 50.4\% | 53.2\% | 51.4\% | 49.0\% | 24.2\% | 7.6\% | -1.1\% | -7.4\% | 4.8\% | -2.0\% | 4.1\% | 4.9\% | -0.8\% | 1.4\% | -1.6\% | -2.4\% | -2.7\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 7.1\% | 12.2\% | 9.6\% | 10.1\% | 15.4\% | 21.0\% | 18.8\% | 16.3\% | 26.3\% | 21.4\% | 15.2\% | 16.0\% | 19.6\% | 13.8\% | 15.9\% | 19.6\% | 15.3\% | 16.1\% | 6.1\% | 2.4\% | 0.3\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 26.6\% | 32.2\% | 26.0\% | 20.1\% | 0.8\% | 1.1\% | -1.4\% | 4.7\% | -5.0\% | 2.9\% | 2.0\% | 0.9\% | 0.1\% | 3.8\% | -5.5\% | -9.5\% | -7.8\% | -4.8\% | 0.6\% | -0.1\% | -0.3\% |
| China | 20.0\% | 9.1\% | 29.1\% | 18.5\% | 49.0\% | 70.3\% | 115.5\% | 64.7\% | 94.8\% | 45.7\% | 33.5\% | -3.5\% | 33.9\% | 13.8\% | 9.4\% | 3.7\% | 5.1\% | 7.8\% | 1.9\% | 3.5\% | 4.0\% |
| Constant currency growth | 17.4\% | 22.8\% | 22.6\% | 17.5\% | 17.4\% | 20.5\% | 22.0\% | 19.4\% | 16.9\% | 10.8\% | 6.3\% | 0.4\% | 8.4\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.8\% |
| Organic Growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 15.8\% | 13.6\% | 20.5\% | 5.1\% | 10.2\% | 9.6\% | 6.9\% | 8.0\% | 12.1\% | 1.3\% | -2.2\% | -0.9\% | 2.6\% | -5.7\% | -2.3\% | -3.1\% | -3.2\% | -3.6\% | -3.2\% | -2.4\% | -1.9\% |
| Mexico | 19.2\% | 28.6\% | 20.4\% | 10.5\% | 12.4\% | 8.7\% | 8.6\% | 10.0\% | 12.4\% | 6.5\% | 3.5\% | 1.1\% | 5.8\% | -3.0\% | -5.8\% | -2.7\% | -2.1\% | -3.4\% | -2.2\% | -2.4\% | -2.5\% |
| South \& Central America | 18.5\% | 36.7\% | 33.4\% | 40.5\% | 50.4\% | 53.2\% | 51.4\% | 49.0\% | 24.2\% | 7.6\% | -1.1\% | -7.4\% | 4.8\% | -2.0\% | 4.1\% | 4.9\% | -0.8\% | 1.4\% | -1.6\% | -2.4\% | -2.7\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 7.1\% | 12.2\% | 9.6\% | 10.1\% | 15.4\% | 21.0\% | 18.8\% | 16.3\% | 26.3\% | 21.4\% | 15.2\% | 16.0\% | 19.6\% | 13.8\% | 15.9\% | 19.6\% | 15.3\% | 16.1\% | 6.1\% | 2.4\% | 0.3\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 26.6\% | 32.2\% | 26.0\% | 20.1\% | 0.8\% | 1.1\% | -1.4\% | 4.7\% | -5.0\% | 2.9\% | 2.0\% | 0.9\% | 0.1\% | 3.8\% | -5.5\% | -9.5\% | -7.8\% | -4.8\% | 0.6\% | -0.1\% | -0.3\% |
| China | 20.0\% | 9.1\% | 29.1\% | 18.5\% | 49.0\% | 70.3\% | 115.5\% | 64.7\% | 94.8\% | 45.7\% | 33.5\% | -3.5\% | 33.9\% | 13.8\% | 9.4\% | 3.7\% | 5.1\% | 7.8\% | 1.9\% | 3.5\% | 4.0\% |
| Organic growth | 17.4\% | 22.8\% | 22.6\% | 17.5\% | 17.4\% | 20.5\% | 22.0\% | 19.4\% | 16.9\% | 10.8\% | 6.3\% | 0.4\% | 8.4\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.8\% |
| Volume Points | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1013 A | 2Q13 A | 3Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2Q14 A | 3Q14 A | 4Q14 E | FY14 E | 1Q15 E | 2Q15 E | 3Q15 E | 4Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18 E |
| North America | 889 | 987 | 1,158 | 309 | 340 | 314 | 287 | 1,250 | 337 | 336 | 303 | 278 | 1,253 | 317 | 328 | 294 | 269 | 1,208 | 1,169 | 1,141 | 1,119 |
| Mexico | 563 | 705 | 815 | 206 | 220 | 219 | 219 | 864 | 220 | 231 | 219 | 211 | 881 | 214 | 218 | 213 | 206 | 851 | 832 | 811 | 791 |
| South \& Central America | 427 | 570 | 740 | 220 | 223 | 245 | 279 | 966 | 228 | 206 | 204 | 228 | 867 | 223 | 215 | 214 | 226 | 879 | 865 | 844 | 822 |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 487 | 545 | 603 | 161 | 179 | 174 | 184 | 698 | 202 | 219 | 199 | 211 | 831 | 230 | 253 | 238 | 244 | 965 | 1,024 | 1,049 | 1,051 |
| Asia-Pacific | 724 | 962 | 1,198 | 320 | 317 | 296 | 292 | 1,226 | 302 | 320 | 305 | 293 | 1,220 | 313 | 303 | 275 | 270 | 1,161 | 1,169 | 1,168 | 1,164 |
| China | 144 | 154 | 206 | 48 | 86 | 97 | 103 | 334 | 91 | 119 | 121 | 102 | 432 | 104 | 130 | 125 | 107 | 466 | 474 | 491 | 511 |
| Volume points | 3,233 | 3,922 | 4,720 | 1,264 | 1,365 | 1,346 | 1,363 | 5,338 | 1,380 | 1,431 | 1,350 | 1,323 | 5,484 | 1,401 | 1,447 | 1,359 | 1,322 | 5,530 | 5,533 | 5,504 | 5,458 |
| Volume Growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 13.9\% | 11.1\% | 17.3\% | 3.6\% | 11.4\% | 9.3\% | 7.5\% | 8.0\% | 8.9\% | -1.2\% | -3.5\% | -3.1\% | 0.3\% | -5.7\% | -2.3\% | -3.1\% | -3.2\% | -3.6\% | -3.2\% | -2.4\% | -1.9\% |
| Mexico | 14.1\% | 25.1\% | 15.7\% | 7.8\% | 7.8\% | 3.9\% | 4.7\% | 6.0\% | 6.7\% | 5.2\% | -0.3\% | -3.6\% | 1.9\% | -3.0\% | -5.8\% | -2.7\% | -2.1\% | -3.4\% | -2.2\% | -2.4\% | -2.5\% |
| South \& Central America | 3.8\% | 33.3\% | 29.9\% | 33.5\% | 33.1\% | 31.8\% | 25.2\% | 30.5\% | 3.6\% | -7.3\% | -16.6\% | -18.1\% | -10.3\% | -2.0\% | 4.1\% | 4.9\% | -0.8\% | 1.4\% | -1.6\% | -2.4\% | -2.7\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 4.3\% | 12.0\% | 10.6\% | 10.6\% | 16.1\% | 19.2\% | 17.4\% | 15.9\% | 25.4\% | 22.0\% | 14.7\% | 15.0\% | 19.1\% | 13.8\% | 15.9\% | 19.6\% | 15.3\% | 16.1\% | 6.1\% | 2.4\% | 0.3\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 26.8\% | 32.9\% | 24.6\% | 16.9\% | 1.0\% | -3.1\% | -4.0\% | 2.3\% | -5.6\% | 1.0\% | 2.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | 3.8\% | -5.5\% | -9.5\% | -7.8\% | -4.8\% | 0.6\% | -0.1\% | -0.3\% |
| China | 25.0\% | 6.7\% | 34.1\% | 16.4\% | 48.9\% | 70.6\% | 103.4\% | 61.8\% | 91.4\% | 38.0\% | 23.9\% | -0.7\% | 29.6\% | 13.8\% | 9.4\% | 3.7\% | 5.1\% | 7.8\% | 1.9\% | 3.5\% | 4.0\% |
| Volume growth | 13.9\% | 21.3\% | 20.4\% | 13.4\% | 13.5\% | 12.8\% | 12.7\% | 13.1\% | 9.2\% | 4.9\% | 0.3\% | -3.0\% | 2.7\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.1\% | -0.5\% | -0.8\% |

Source: BTIG Research Estimates


| Sales Leaders Growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 13.9\% | 15.1\% | 16.4\% | 9.3\% | 9.8\% | 9.2\% | 8.1\% | 9.1\% | 8.6\% | 4.8\% | 4.2\% | 4.0\% | 5.4\% | 2.1\% | -0.7\% | -3.1\% | -2.7\% | -1.1\% | -1.9\% | -1.0\% | -0.6\% |
| Mexico | 10.2\% | 25.2\% | 20.9\% | 14.3\% | 12.5\% | 7.5\% | 7.6\% | 10.3\% | 5.6\% | 2.7\% | 3.6\% | 0.9\% | 3.1\% | 5.8\% | 4.2\% | 0.7\% | 0.6\% | 2.8\% | 0.5\% | 0.3\% | 0.2\% |
| South \& Central America | 3.2\% | 21.2\% | 28.7\% | 28.2\% | 30.1\% | 29.1\% | 29.1\% | 29.1\% | 18.9\% | 13.8\% | 7.1\% | -1.3\% | 9.0\% | 5.6\% | 5.7\% | 2.8\% | 2.2\% | 4.1\% | 1.4\% | 0.6\% | 0.2\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 2.9\% | 15.1\% | 14.2\% | 11.5\% | 11.7\% | 13.1\% | 13.9\% | 12.6\% | 17.4\% | 18.1\% | 17.6\% | 15.1\% | 17.0\% | 18.3\% | 16.3\% | 13.4\% | 11.8\% | 14.8\% | 8.3\% | 4.5\% | 2.3\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 25.8\% | 34.3\% | 31.2\% | 23.3\% | 15.4\% | 9.7\% | 6.1\% | 13.1\% | 4.3\% | 5.8\% | 5.2\% | 4.7\% | 5.0\% | 8.6\% | 4.3\% | 2.4\% | 1.9\% | 4.2\% | 1.1\% | 0.4\% | 0.2\% |
| China | 15.7\% | 28.7\% | 32.6\% | 24.5\% | 17.8\% | 25.1\% | 38.7\% | 26.7\% | 40.3\% | 32.9\% | 23.1\% | 9.9\% | 25.0\% | 13.2\% | -0.5\% | -5.7\% | -4.4\% | 0.2\% | -2.4\% | -0.9\% | -0.3\% |
| Sales leaders growth | 11.5\% | 22.4\% | 22.2\% | 17.7\% | 15.4\% | 13.3\% | 13.1\% | 14.7\% | 11.1\% | 9.4\% | 7.8\% | 4.4\% | 8.0\% | 8.2\% | 5.4\% | 2.4\% | 2.2\% | 4.5\% | 1.6\% | 0.9\% | 0.5\% |


| North America | 18.0 | 17.4 | 17.5 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 17.3 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 16.5 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 16.1 | 15.9 | 15 | 15.4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mexico | 14.8 | 14.8 | 14.1 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 13.6 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 13.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 12.6 | 12.3 | 12.0 | 11.6 |
| South \& Central America | 14.8 | 16.3 | 16.5 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 16.6 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 13.7 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 12.2 |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 14.5 | 14.1 | 13.7 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 14.1 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 14.3 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 14.5 | 14.2 | 13.9 | 13.6 |
| Asia-Pacific | 20.2 | 20.0 | 18.9 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 17.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 16.2 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 14.8 | 14.8 | 14.7 | 14.6 |
| China | 21.1 | 17.4 | 17.6 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 22.5 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 5.3 | 23.4 | 5.5 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 5.9 | 25.1 | 26.2 | 27.4 | 28.6 |
| Sales leader productivity | 17.4 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 16.7 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 15.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 15.4 | 15.1 | 14.9 | 14.7 |
| Productivity Growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 0.1\% | -3.5\% | 0.8\% | -5.3\% | 1.5\% | 0.0\% | -0.5\% | -1.0\% | 0.3\% | -5.8\% | -7.4\% | -6.9\% | -4.8\% | -7.7\% | -1.6\% | 0.0\% | -0.5\% | -2.5\% | -1.4\% | -1.4\% | -1.4\% |
| Mexico | 3.5\% | -0.1\% | -4.3\% | -5.7\% | -4.1\% | -3.4\% | -2.7\% | -3.9\% | 1.1\% | 2.4\% | -3.8\% | -4.5\% | -1.2\% | -8.3\% | -9.6\% | -3.4\% | -2.7\% | -6.0\% | -2.7\% | -2.7\% | -2.7\% |
| South \& Central America | 0.6\% | 10.0\% | 0.9\% | 4.1\% | 2.3\% | 2.1\% | -3.0\% | 1.0\% | -12.8\% | -18.6\% | -22.2\% | -17.1\% | -17.7\% | -7.3\% | -1.5\% | 2.1\% | -3.0\% | -2.6\% | -2.9\% | -2.9\% | -2.9\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 1.4\% | -2.7\% | -3.2\% | -0.9\% | 3.9\% | 5.5\% | 3.1\% | 2.9\% | 6.8\% | 3.3\% | -2.5\% | -0.2\% | 1.8\% | -3.8\% | -0.4\% | 5.5\% | 3.1\% | 1.1\% | -2.0\% | -2.0\% | -2.0\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 0.8\% | -1.0\% | -5.1\% | -5.2\% | -12.5\% | -11.7\% | -9.5\% | -9.5\% | -9.5\% | -4.5\% | -2.2\% | -4.4\% | -5.2\% | -4.4\% | -9.4\% | -11.7\% | -9.5\% | -8.6\% | -0.5\% | -0.5\% | -0.5\% |
| China | 8.1\% | -17.1\% | 1.1\% | -6.5\% | 26.4\% | 36.3\% | 46.7\% | 27.6\% | 36.4\% | 3.8\% | 0.7\% | -9.7\% | 3.7\% | 0.6\% | 10.0\% | 10.0\% | 10.0\% | 7.6\% | 4.4\% | 4.4\% | 4.4\% |
| Productivity growth | 2.2\% | -0.9\% | -1.5\% | -3.7\% | -1.6\% | -0.4\% | -0.3\% | -1.4\% | -1.8\% | -4.1\% | -6.9\% | -7.0\% | -4.9\% | -6.1\% | -4.1\% | -1.7\% | -2.2\% | -3.5\% | -1.5\% | -1.4\% | -1.3\% |
| Pricing | FY10 A | FY11 A | FY12 A | 1Q13 A | 2013 A | 3 Q13 A | 4Q13 A | FY13 A | 1Q14 A | 2 Q 14 A | 3Q14 A | 4 Q 14 E | FY14 E | 1Q15 E | 2 Q15 E | 3Q15 E | 4 Q15 E | FY15 E | FY16 E | FY17 E | FY18E |
| North America | 1.9\% | 2.5\% | 3.2\% | 1.5\% | -1.2\% | 0.3\% | -0.6\% | 0.0\% | 3.2\% | 2.5\% | 1.3\% | 2.2\% | 2.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Mexico | 5.1\% | 3.5\% | 4.7\% | 2.7\% | 4.6\% | 4.8\% | 3.9\% | 4.0\% | 5.7\% | 1.3\% | 3.8\% | 4.7\% | 3.8\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| South \& Central America | 14.7\% | 3.4\% | 3.5\% | 7.0\% | 17.3\% | 21.4\% | 26.2\% | 18.5\% | 20.6\% | 14.9\% | 15.5\% | 10.7\% | 15.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | 2.8\% | 0.2\% | -1.0\% | -0.5\% | -0.7\% | 1.8\% | 1.3\% | 0.4\% | 0.9\% | -0.6\% | 0.5\% | 1.0\% | 0.5\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Asia-Pacific | -0.2\% | -0.7\% | 1.4\% | 3.2\% | -0.2\% | 4.2\% | 2.6\% | 2.4\% | 0.6\% | 1.9\% | -0.8\% | 0.8\% | 0.6\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| China | -5.0\% | 2.4\% | -5.0\% | 2.1\% | 0.1\% | -0.3\% | 12.1\% | 2.9\% | 3.4\% | 7.7\% | 9.6\% | -2.8\% | 4.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Pricing | 3.5\% | 1.5\% | 2.2\% | 4.1\% | 3.9\% | 7.7\% | 9.4\% | 6.3\% | 7.7\% | 5.9\% | 6.0\% | 3.3\% | 5.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Currency |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North America | 0.3\% | 0.2\% | -0.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | -0.1\% | -0.2\% | -0.1\% | -0.2\% | -0.1\% | -0.1\% | 0.0\% | -0.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Mexico | 7.8\% | 2.2\% | -6.9\% | 3.0\% | 9.5\% | 2.1\% | -0.7\% | 3.4\% | -5.0\% | -4.4\% | -1.6\% | -3.6\% | -3.7\% | -1.9\% | -3.7\% | -2.7\% | 0.0\% | -2.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| South \& Central America | -12.1\% | 5.3\% | -9.2\% | -7.8\% | -4.7\% | -9.2\% | -8.6\% | -7.7\% | -12.8\% | -16.1\% | -13.8\% | -21.1\% | -16.3\% | -1.4\% | -4.6\% | -3.5\% | 0.1\% | -2.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Europe, ME, Africa | -2.4\% | 4.4\% | -7.5\% | 0.0\% | -0.1\% | 2.2\% | 1.2\% | 0.8\% | -1.8\% | 0.6\% | -2.7\% | -8.8\% | -3.3\% | -8.4\% | -8.6\% | -5.5\% | 0.0\% | -5.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Asia-Pacific | 7.6\% | 5.1\% | -4.6\% | -0.2\% | 0.1\% | -2.6\% | -3.8\% | -1.7\% | -5.0\% | -0.5\% | 2.9\% | -1.6\% | -1.2\% | -0.3\% | -3.1\% | -3.0\% | 0.0\% | -1.7\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| China | 1.1\% | 5.2\% | 3.0\% | 1.7\% | 4.3\% | 6.2\% | 5.7\% | 4.6\% | 3.7\% | -1.8\% | -0.9\% | -0.7\% | -0.4\% | -0.4\% | 1.6\% | 0.6\% | 0.0\% | 0.5\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |

Source: BTIG Research Estimates

HERBALIFE
\$ millions
Revenue by R
United States
Mexico

| Mexico |
| :--- |
| China |


| China |
| :--- |
| Others |
| Total revenues |



| Others | 1,620 | 2,130 | 2,481 | 706 | 714 | 712 | 778 | 2,910 | 750 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total revenues | 2,734 | 3,455 | 4,072 | 1,124 | 1,219 | 1,214 | 1,269 | 4,825 | 1,263 | 1,306 | 1,256 | 1,187 | 5,012 | 1,272 | 1,295 | 1,244 | 1,193 | 5,004 | 5,026 | 5,020 | 4,996 |



| Contribution Margin |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| United States | 43.2\% | 42.3\% | 44.0\% | 43.8\% | 41.2\% | 40.6\% | 40.3\% | 41.5\% | 43.0\% | 41.6\% | 41.3\% | 39.5\% | 41.4\% | 42.0\% | 40.6\% | 40.3\% | 38.5\% | 40.4\% | 40.4\% | 40.4\% | 40.4\% |
| Mexico | 39.4\% | 43.7\% | 41.4\% | 44.1\% | 44.0\% | 46.1\% | 44.8\% | 44.8\% | 43.0\% | 43.1\% | 44.7\% | 44.0\% | 43.7\% | 42.0\% | 42.1\% | 43.7\% | 43.0\% | 42.7\% | 42.7\% | 42.7\% | 42.7\% |
| China | 42.1\% | 42.5\% | 45.5\% | 42.5\% | 44.6\% | 45.1\% | 43.0\% | 43.9\% | 46.2\% | 42.0\% | 41.2\% | 42.2\% | 42.7\% | 45.2\% | 41.0\% | 40.2\% | 41.2\% | 41.8\% | 41.8\% | 41.8\% | 41.8\% |
| Others | 44.5\% | 45.7\% | 44.6\% | 45.3\% | 45.3\% | 45.4\% | 46.0\% | 45.5\% | 45.8\% | 45.8\% | 45.1\% | 45.2\% | 45.5\% | 44.8\% | 44.8\% | 44.1\% | 44.2\% | 44.5\% | 44.5\% | 44.5\% | 44.5\% |
| Segment operating profit | 43.4\% | 44.6\% | 44.1\% | 44.7\% | 44.2\% | 44.6\% | 44.6\% | 44.5\% | 45.0\% | 44.2\% | 43.8\% | 43.7\% | 44.2\% | 44.0\% | 43.2\% | 42.8\% | 42.7\% | 43.2\% | 43.2\% | 43.2\% | 43.2\% |
| Corporate expenses | -28.4\% | -28.3\% | -27.9\% | -27.5\% | -27.5\% | -27.7\% | -29.0\% | -28.0\% | -27.4\% | -28.1\% | -28.9\% | -29.0\% | -28.3\% | -27.9\% | -28.6\% | -29.4\% | -29.5\% | -28.8\% | -28.8\% | -28.8\% | -28.8\% |
| EBIT (underlying) | 15.1\% | 16.3\% | 16.2\% | 17.2\% | 16.7\% | 16.9\% | 15.6\% | 16.6\% | 17.6\% | 16.1\% | 15.0\% | 14.7\% | 15.9\% | 16.1\% | 14.5\% | 13.4\% | 13.2\% | 14.3\% | 14.4\% | 14.4\% | 14.4\% |

## Margin Improvement

| United States | -295 bp | -87 bp | 171 bp | -285 bp | -175 bp | -429 bp | -129 bp | -255 bp | -81 bp | 43 bp | 78 bp | -80 bp | -5 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -99 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mexico | 19 bp | 431 bp | -230 bp | 660 bp | 295 bp | 305 bp | -260 bp | 331 bp | -107 bp | -82 bp | -142 bp | -80 bp | -104 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -99 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp |
| China | 721 bp | 37 bp | 295 bp | -216 bp | -199 bp | -55 bp | -172 bp | -154 bp | 376 bp | -254 bp | -386 bp | -80 bp | -118 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -95 bp | -1 bp | 0 bp | bp |
| Others | 123 bp | $\underline{116 \mathrm{bp}}$ | $\underline{-111 \mathrm{bp}}$ | 90 bp | -27bp | 121 bp | 186 bp | 94 bp | 46 bp | $\underline{51 \mathrm{bp}}$ | -33 bp | -80 bp | -5 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | -100 bp | $\underline{-100 ~ b p}$ | -100 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp |
| Segment operating profit | 53 bp | 114 bp | -44 bp | 65 bp | -31 bp | 26 bp | 96 bp | 39 bp | 29 bp | -3 bp | -73 bp | -92 bp | $-34 \mathrm{bp}$ | -97 bp | -104 bp | -103 bp | -97 bp | -100 bp | 3 bp | 1 bp | 0 bp |
| Corporate expenses | 141 bp | 9 bp | 41 bp | 59 bp | -107 bp | 78 bp | $-43 \mathrm{bp}$ | -5 bp | 8 bp | -62 bp | $-115 \mathrm{bp}$ | 0 bp | -39 bp | -50 bp | $-50 \mathrm{bp}$ | $-50 \mathrm{bp}$ | -50 bp | -50 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp | 0 bp |
| EBIT (underlying) | 195 bp | 122 bp | -3 bp | 124 bp | $-138 \mathrm{bp}$ | 105 bp | 53 bp | 34 bp | 37 bp | $-65 \mathrm{bp}$ | $-189 \mathrm{bp}$ | -92 bp | -73 bp | $-147 \mathrm{bp}$ | -154 bp | $-153 \mathrm{bp}$ | -147 bp | $-150 \mathrm{bp}$ | 3 bp | 1 bp | 0 bp | Source: BTIG Research Estimates

## Appendix

## Analyst Certification

I, April Scee, hereby certify that the views about the companies and securities discussed in this report are accurately expressed and that I have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing specific recommendations or views in this report.

I, Abhinav Kapur, hereby certify that the views about the companies and securities discussed in this report are accurately expressed and that I have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing specific recommendations or views in this report.

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## Risks

$\bullet$ Elevated volatility due to changes in investor sentiment •Increased regulatory scrutiny $\bullet$ Change in regulatory landscape leading to business model changes $\bullet$ Further declines in sales leader recruitment •Inability to take pricing at historic levels $\bullet$ Continued negative publicity via high-profile short-seller $\bullet$ Negative headwinds from VEN

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